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ABSTRACT ————————————————————————————————————
The FOREX market is an over-the-counter market (in fact, the largest in the world) character-
ized by bilateral trade, intermediation, and significant bid-ask spreads. The existing interna-
tional macroeconomics literature has failed to account for these stylized facts largely due to
the fact that it models the FOREX as a standard Walrasian market, therefore overlooking some
important institutional details of this market. In this paper, we build on recent developments
in monetary theory and finance to construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of interme-
diation in the FOREX market. A key concept in our approach is that immediate trade between
ultimate buyers and sellers of foreign currencies is obstructed by search frictions (e.g., due to
geographic dispersion). We use our framework to compute standard measures of FOREX mar-
ket liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads and trade volume, and to study how these measures are
affected both by macroeconomic fundamentals and the FOREX market microstructure. We also
show that the FOREX market microstructure critically affects the volume of international trade
and, consequently, welfare. Hence, our paper highlights that modeling the FOREX as a friction-
less Walrasian market is not without loss of generality.
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1 Introduction
The foreign exchange (FOREX) market is an institution of paramount importance since it consti-
tutes the channel through which international liquidity is allocated, thus assisting international
trade and investment. Moreover, the FOREX market is an over-the-counter (OTC) market,
in fact, the largest in the world, characterized by bilateral trade, intermediation, and bid-ask
spreads (see Lyons (2001) and ?). The traditional international macroeconomics literature has
failed to account for these characteristics largely due to the fact that it models the FOREX as
a standard, frictionless Walrasian market, therefore overlooking some important institutional
details of this market. To remedy this deficiency we build on recent developments in monetary
theory and finance to construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of intermediation in the
FOREX market. We use this framework to compute explicitly standard measures of FOREX
market liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads and trade volume, and to study how these measures
are affected both by monetary policy and the FOREX market microstructure. Our model offers
new and important insights in comparison to the conventional approach, since it allows us to
examine how the FOREX trading frictions affect the volume of international trade and, conse-
quently, welfare.
To motivate our story, consider an agent who resides in country A and wishes to acquire cur-
rency of country B (e.g., in order to purchase some goods or services from a firm in that country,
buy some assets in that country, or go on vacation to that country). At the same time, an agent
who resides in country B might wish to acquire currency of country A for similar reasons. If
these two agents could contact each other, they might be able to carry out a mutually beneficial
currency trade.1 However, an immediate contact between the two agents might be difficult:
the environment described here is clearly characterized by search frictions. If there exists a third
party who can bypass these frictions, then intermediation services will arise naturally. This
idea, which can be traced back to Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), seems especially relevant
within the context of the FOREX market, given the difficulty of immediate trade among (ulti-
mate) buyers and sellers of foreign currencies (e.g., due to geographic dispersion).
To formalize this idea, we develop a two-country, two-currency monetary-search model
based on Lagos and Wright (2005) (henceforth, LW). Due to frictions, such as anonymity and
limited commitment, trade of home goods in each country necessitates the use of local cur-
rency.2 Agents work in their home country and receive local currency which they use to pur-
chase home goods, but they can also exchange for foreign currency in the FOREX market,
1 This argument implicitly assumes the absence of a global centralized market for currencies, which is the case
in practice. In this paper, we remain agnostic as to why such a market does not exist, and choose to model the
FOREX market in an empirically relevant way, i.e., as a decentralized OTC market.
2 Strictly speaking, these frictions make the use of a medium of exchange necessary, and agents are free to carry
out transactions using either currency. The fact that only local currency is accepted in home goods trade is a result
of the model rather than an assumption. For more details, see Section 2.1.
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should an opportunity to consume abroad arise. We model the FOREX market as an OTC mar-
ket following the influential work of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005) (henceforth, DGP).
In this market, agents who wish to acquire foreign currency meet with FOREX intermediators
or dealers in a bilateral fashion and privately negotiate over the terms of trade. A key feature of
the model is that FOREX dealers can participate in a well-networked interdealer market, which
guarantees access to a large pool of agents (i.e., traders represented by other dealers) who offer
what their clients are searching for, namely, foreign currency. The unique ability of dealers to
access this frictionless market is precisely what allows them to bypass the search frictions that
obstruct direct trade among agents, and, hence, charge positive bid-ask spreads.
The model delivers closed form solutions for the dealers’ bid and ask prices, and allows us
to study how the spread is affected both by market microstructure (e.g., dealer availability and
agents’ bargaining positions), and by macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g., inflation). We find
that the spread is negatively related to dealer availability. A lower ex ante likelihood of con-
tacting a dealer discourages agents from carrying large amounts of real home money balances
(which is costly), thus, making them more liquidity constrained and increasing their marginal
benefit from consuming foreign goods. As a result, these agents are willing to give up more
units of home currency in exchange for one unit of foreign currency, which allows dealers to
extract higher fees. Since the ease with which agents can contact a dealer is typically interpreted
as a measure of market liquidity, this result implies that bid-ask spreads will be tighter in more
liquid markets, a finding which is well-established both in the theoretical and the empirical fi-
nance literature (e.g., see DGP and the references therein). However, the channel through which
this result emerges in our framework is quite different. For instance, in DGP, a higher probabil-
ity of contacting a dealer effectively increases the agent’s bargaining power (and tightens the
spread) by making access to alternative trading partners easier. In our paper, a higher probabil-
ity of contacting a dealer effectively increases the agent’s bargaining power by making her less
liquidity constraint, and, thus, less eager to acquire foreign currency in the FOREX market.
We also find that the bid-ask spread is increasing in the dealers’ bargaining power. An in-
crease in the dealers’ bargaining power induces agents to carry a larger amount of real home
money balances into the FOREX market, because they realize that they will now need to give up
more units of home currency to acquire one unit of foreign currency. As we have already seen,
this tends to make agents less liquidity constrained, and effectively improve their bargaining
position. However, while the typical agent carries more (real) home currency, a disproportion-
ately large fraction of this currency is collected by the dealer as a fee, and, ultimately, the net
effect on the bid-ask spread is positive.
In addition, we show that an increase in anticipated inflation in the home country leads to a
wider bid-ask spread. Given the earlier discussion, this result is quite intuitive. Since inflation
in the home currency captures the cost of carrying real home money balances, a higher inflation
makes home agents more liquidity constrained and increases the marginal benefit of consum-
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ing foreign goods. Put simply, a high rate of inflation in the home country makes agents more
desperate for the foreign good and, hence, the foreign currency, and effectively worsens their
bargaining position allowing dealers to extract higher fees.
Our model also has interesting implications for the FOREX trade volume. We character-
ize trade volume at both layers of the FOREX market, i.e., agent-dealer and interdealer trade,
and we find a positive correlation between dealer availability and trade volume at both levels.
Like before, an increase in the ex ante likelihood of contacting a dealer raises the amount of
real home money balances that agents bring into the FOREX market. As a result, in any given
agent-dealer meeting, a larger volume of currencies change hands, but, moreover, dealers (who
represent agents who now have a higher demand for foreign currency) place larger orders for
foreign currencies in the interdealer market. Except from this indirect positive effect on the in-
tensive margin, an increase in dealer availability also directly increases the extensive margin of
agent-dealer trade volume, since it implies a higher number of agent-dealer matches.
Interestingly, changes in the dealers’ bargaining position affect the volume at the two layers
of FOREX trade differently. For instance, consider an increase in the dealers’ bargaining power,
which, as we saw, induces agents to carry more real home money balances into the FOREX mar-
ket. Since an even larger fraction of the (higher) real balances is now reaped by the dealers, the
effect of such change on the agent-dealer trade volume is undoubtedly positive. However, since
a large fraction of real balances ends up directly in the dealers’ pockets as a fee, the amount of
currencies that get re-shuffled through the interdealer market, i.e., the interdealer trade volume,
decreases. Finally, we show that a higher inflation in either country lowers the trade volume at
both layers of FOREX trade through the usual negative effect on real balances.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that models the FOREX market as a
decentralized OTC market within a dynamic general equilibrium framework. However, mod-
eling the FOREX market in an empirically relevant way is not an end in itself. We show that
the FOREX market microstructure critically affects the volume of international trade and, con-
sequently, welfare. Hence, our paper highlights that modeling the FOREX as a frictionless
Walrasian market is not without loss of generality. We find that as dealer availability improves,
the equilibrium real home money balances increase, and agents can afford to purchase more
foreign currency, and, hence, more foreign goods. Thus, a more liquid FOREX market boosts
the volume of international trade and improves welfare. An increase in the dealers’ bargaining
power has even more interesting effects. On the one hand, it hurts agents who obtain a foreign
consumption opportunity, because these agents now have to pay higher intermediation fees.
On the other hand, it may benefit agents who do not obtain such an opportunity (ex post), be-
cause it induces them to carry a larger amount of real home money balances in anticipation of
the higher fees (ex ante). We show that if inflation is relatively high, and foreign consumption
opportunities and/or dealer availability are relatively low, the second (positive) effect domi-
nates, and an increase in the dealers’ bargaining power can actually improve social welfare.
3
1.1 Related Literature
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the early 70s, advanced economies started
adopting a floating exchange rate regime, which spurred a large literature on the FOREX rate
determination. Some early works include Dornbusch (1976), Lucas (1982), and Meese and Ro-
goff (1983). These seminal papers, and the ones inspired by them, are useful to study the effect
of macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g., inflation and productivity in each country) on the deter-
mination of the FOREX rate. However, the international macroeconomics literature typically
models the FOREX market as a perfectly competitive market, therefore overlooking some im-
portant institutional details of this market, such as intermediation, spreads, etc.
As a response, a new approach, often referred to as the FOREX microstructure literature,
has emerged over the last two decades. Influential works in this dimension of research include
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Ito, Lyons, and Melvin (1998), Evans and Lyons (2002), and Evans
and Lyons (2005). In this literature, the role of intermediation in the FOREX market is explicitly
studied, and it arises due to the presence of frictions, such as adverse selection and inventory
costs.3 Although the microstructure literature has given us fruitful insights on many aspects
of the FOREX rate determination which had been overlooked by the international macroeco-
nomics literature, it has itself neglected the role of macroeconomic fundamentals, which is ar-
guably very important for the determination of exchange rates in the long-run.
Our paper can be viewed as an attempt to bridge the gap between the two strands of the
literature.4 Modeling the FOREX market as an OTC market within a dynamic general equilib-
rium framework allows us to study questions that neither of the two existing approaches can
study in isolation. For instance, our model can be used to examine the effect of monetary pol-
icy on standard measures of FOREX market liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads. This would not
be possible within the international macroeconomics literature, because, as is well-known, in a
Walrasian market there is no room for intermediation and spreads. Also, studying this ques-
tion would not be possible within the microstructure literature, because the majority of these
papers adopt a partial equilibrium approach, where foreign currency is not explicitly modeled
as money whose holding cost is controlled by monetary policy. Similarly, our paper offers a
framework for studying how the FOREX market microstructure can affect international trade
and welfare, which would not be possible within either of the existing strands of the literature.
In addition, our search-based approach to modeling intermediation in the FOREX market
sets this paper aside from the microstructure literature, where intermediation typically arises
3 The first is based on the idea that some information relevant to exchange rates is not publicly available. In
the presence of asymmetric information, intermediaries can arise and charge bid-ask spreads due to their ability to
buffer against adverse selection (for example, see Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle
(1985)). The inventory cost based models revolve around the idea that intermediaries can provide immediacy (i.e.,
guarantee of fast service) in an environment where holding positive inventories is costly (for example, see Amihud
and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1981)).
4 Lyons (2001) estimates that “the uneasy dichotomy between macro and micro approaches is destined to fade”.
Nevertheless, even today the gap between the macroeconomic and the microstructure approach remains large.
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due to the existence of adverse selection or inventory costs.5 Although these frictions seem
relevant within the context of the FOREX market, we believe that the search frictions approach
is also extremely relevant, given the inherent difficulty of immediate trade among buyers and
sellers of foreign currencies, mainly, but not exclusively, due to the geographic dispersion of
these agents (see Section 2.1 for a more detailed discussion). Hence, it is somewhat surprising
that this simple idea has not been formally described in the FOREX market literature before.
Methodologically our paper is closely related to Lagos and Zhang (2014), who also develop
a monetary-search model augmented to include OTC financial trade, and use it to study the
effect of monetary policy on asset prices and the OTC market liquidity. Our model extends this
framework to an open-economy setting in order to specifically study the performance of the
FOREX market, and how it affects international trade and welfare. Geromichalos and Herren-
brueck (2012) consider a model where agents can allocate their wealth between money and an
illiquid asset, and, following an idiosyncratic consumption shock, they can acquire additional
liquidity in an OTC financial market. The present paper has similar structure since agents who
get an opportunity to consume abroad can acquire foreign currency in the OTC FOREX market.
Our paper is also related to Trejos and Wright (2012), who develop a framework that nests the
DGP model into a “second-generation” monetary-search model (e.g. Shi (1995) and Trejos and
Wright (1995)) and discuss similarities and differences between the two literatures.
The present paper is closely related to a number of works that employ monetary-search
models to address long-standing questions in international macroeconomics. For instance, Mat-
suyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) develop a two-country search model and study the condi-
tions under which the two currencies arise as media of exchange in different countries. Wright
and Trejos (2001) study the same question, but they employ a second generation monetary-
search model where prices are endogenized using bargaining theory. Head and Shi (2003) de-
velop a two-country model and show that the nominal exchange rate depends on the stocks
and growth rates of the two monies. More recently, Geromichalos and Simonovska (2014) build
a two-country model where assets can help agents facilitate international transactions, and use
it to rationalize the well-known asset home bias puzzle. Zhang (2014) develops an information-
based theory of international currency, and shows that the threat of losing international status
imposes an inflation discipline on the issuing country. Finally, Bignon, Breton, and Rojas Breu
(2013) build a two-country model of currency and endogenous default to study whether im-
pediments to credit market integration can affect the desirability of a currency union.6
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the physical environ-
ment and the salient features of the FOREX market that our model aims to capture. Section
3 studies the agents’ optimal behavior. Section 4 defines a stationary equilibrium in the two-
5 In that respect, our theory of intermediation is closer to Shevchenko (2004) and Wright and Wong (2014).
6 Jung and Pyun (2015) and Jung and Lee (2015) also study how liquidity premia of assets can rationalize other
international asset pricing puzzle such as excess international reserves hoarding and violation of the uncovered
interest parity puzzle respectively.
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country model, and describes how the key variables are affected by changes in macroeconomic
fundamentals and the FOREX market microstructure. Section 5 concludes.
2 Physical Environment
Time is infinite and discrete. There are two countries,A andB. Each country has a unit measure
of buyers, and sellers with a measure equal to 1 + δ, δ ∈ [0, 1]. The identity of buyers and sellers
is fixed over time. We will use the terms “buyer (seller) from country i” and “buyer (seller) i”
interchangeably. There exists a third type of agents called dealers with a measure of v. Dealers
have no national identity. All agents are infinitely lived and discount future at rate β ∈ (0, 1).
Three divisible and non-storable consumption goods are produced and traded: a general good
produced by all agents and a special good i produced only by sellers in each country i ∈ {A,B}.
Each country’s monetary authority issues a perfectly divisible and storable fiat currency, which
we will refer to as moneyi, i ∈ {A,B}. Let Ami,t denote the stock of moneyi at time t. The
money stock is initially given by Ami,0 ∈ R++, and thereafter it grows at a constant rate γi (i.e.,
Ami,t+1 = γiAmi,t), where γi ≥ β is chosen by the monetary authority in country i. New moneyi
is introduced (if γi > 1) or withdrawn (if γi < 1) via lump-sum transfers to buyers of country i
at the end of every period.
Each period is divided into three subperiods characterized by different economic activities.
We begin with an intuitive description of the environment. A formal decription of each subpe-
riod will follow. In the third subperiod, agents trade in perfectly competitive or Walrasian mar-
kets. This subperiod can be thought of as the settlement stage, where agents from each country
work and choose a portfolio of (local) money holdings to bring with them in the following
period. In the second subperiod, trade takes place in decentralized markets characterized by
anonymity and imperfect credit. Due to these frictions, trade in this subperiod necessitates the
use of a medium of exchange (MOE). Agents who wish to acquire foreign currency, in order to
purchase foreign goods during the round of decentralized trade, can do so in the FOREX mar-
ket which opens in the first subperiod of each period. Hence, the FOREX market is strategically
placed before the decentralized goods markets open, but after agents have found out whether
they have an opportunity to consume the foreign (special) good in the current period.
We now proceed to a formal description of the subperiods, starting with the third one and
moving backwards. In the third subperiod, all agents have access to a technology that allows
them to transform a unit of labor into a unit of general good. Buyers and sellers from country
i trade the general good with moneyi within country i’s spot Walrasian or centralized market
(henceforth, CMi). The two CMs are distinct from each other: agents from country i cannot
participate in CM−i, and moneyi is not traded in CM−i. However, dealers can access both CMs,
which plays a key role in their ability to serve as intermediators in the FOREX market. At the
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end of the third subperiod, a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of buyers obtain an opportunity to consume the
foreign special good in the forthcoming period. These buyers are referred to as the C-types, and
the rest are referred to as the N-types. All buyers get to consume the local special good.
In the second subperiod, a distinct decentralized market opens in each country (henceforth,
DMi). In DMi, local sellers and buyers, who might be locals or foreigners, trade special good
i. Within any DM , trade is bilateral and anonymous, and buyers cannot commit to repaying
their debt. Thus, all trade has to be quid pro quo. When a seller meets a foreign buyer, the buyer
can, in principle, pay the seller with a combination of local and foreign currency. However, as
we have seen, seller i cannot visit CM−i, and, therefore, she will not accept foreign currency
as payment.7 Hence, although we do not make assumptions that explicitly preclude money−i
from serving as a MOE in DMi, it turns out that only local currency will serve as a MOE in each
DM . This implies that C-type buyers −i who did not acquire moneyi in the FOREX market (see
next paragraph), will not participate in DMi. Thus, in any DM , the measure of sellers (1 + δ) is
weakly greater than the measure of buyers, and we assume that all buyers (i.e., agents on the
short side of the market) match with a seller. The probability with which a seller matches with
a local or foreign buyer only depends on the relative measures of these two groups. Finally,
within any given match, buyers make a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offer to the seller.
Given the discussion so far, it follows that C-type buyers want to acquire foreign currency
before DM trade begins. Interestingly, buyers from country i hold precisely what (C-type) buy-
ers from country−i need: moneyi. However, to make things interesting and realistic, we assume
that immediate trade between these agents is impossible. Buyers who wish to acquire foreign
currency have to visit the FOREX market which operates in the first subperiod. Following DGP,
we model this market as an OTC market characterized by search and bilateral trade between
dealers and buyers. Let αD ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability with which the typical dealer contacts
a buyer in the FOREX, so, by symmetry, αD/2 is the probability that this buyer is a citizen of
country i, i ∈ {A,B}. Similarly, αi ∈ [0, 1] represents the probability with which buyer i con-
tacts a dealer. Within any given buyer-dealer pair, the terms of trade are determined through
proportional bargaining (Kalai (1977)), with θ ∈ [0, 1] denoting the dealer’s bargaining power.
When a dealer meets with a C-type buyer −i she can provide that agent with moneyi that
comes from two potential sources. First, the dealer may carry some moneyi that she acquired in
the preceding CMi (recall that a dealer can visit both CMs). Second, the dealer has immediate
access to a perfectly competitive interdealer market, where she can acquiremoneyi, at the ongoing
market price, from dealers who either contacted buyers i or carry moneyi on their own account.
7 Given that currencies are fiat, an agent will hold money only for two reasons: i) to use it as a MOE to purchase
special goods in the DM round of trade; or ii) to sell it for the general good in the CM round of trade. Since the
identity of agents is fixed, a seller will never hold money in order to use it as a MOE. A seller might be willing to
accept money as a MOE in the DM , if she hopes to trade it for some general good in the forthcoming CM . But, by
assumption, seller i never gets to visit CM−i, i.e., the market where money−i is traded for general good. Hence, a
seller’s valuation for the foreign currency is zero, and, she will never accept it as a MOE.
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The ability of dealers to access this frictionless market is precisely what allows them to bypass
the search frictions that obstruct direct currency trade between buyers.8 This assumption is also
consistent with the fact that, in practice, FOREX dealers have access to a well-networked inter-
dealer market. We have now finished describing all three subperiods. The timing of events is
summarized in Figure 1.
1st subperiod 2nd subperiod 3rd subperiod
Figure 1: Timing of trading process
Finally, consider agents’ preferences. The utility of the typical buyer i is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {u(qt) + u(q˜t) +Xt −Ht} ,
where qt (q˜t) denotes consumption of the local (foreign) special good in the second subperiod
of period t. The terms Xt and Ht stand for the consumption of general good and the effort to
produce that good in the third subperiod of period t, respectively.9 We assume that u(·) is twice
continuously differentiable, with u(0) = 0, u′(·) > 0, u′(0) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0, and u′′(·) < 0. The
term E0 denotes the expectation with respect to the probability measure induced by the random
trading process in the DMs. The utility of the typical seller i is given by
8 Assuming that dealers have access to a competitive interdealer market is standard in the recent literature on
OTC financial trade; e.g., see Weill (2011) and Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2011).
9 All the results will remain unaltered if one assumes quasi-linear (instead of linear) preferences, as in LW. The
linear utility specification is consistent with the interpretation of the CM as a pure liquidity or settlement market;
e.g., see Chiu and Molico (2010).
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E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {−qt +Xt −Ht} ,
where Xt, Ht,E0 are as above, and −qt is the disutility of producing qt units special good in the
second subperiod of t (i.e., without loss of generality, we assume that the disutility is linear).
Finally, the utility of the typical dealer (who does not participate in the DM) is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {Xt −Ht} ,
where all the symbols have already been explained.
2.1 Discussion of the Physical Environment
Since this is (to the best of our knowledge) the first open-economy monetary model that speci-
fies the FOREX market explicitly as a decentralized OTC market, some of the model’s assump-
tions might appear to be non-standard, and, hence, deserve some discussion.
For instance, we assume that agents from country i cannot visit CM−i, where money−i is
traded in a competitive environment.10 This assumption aims to capture the simple and em-
pirically relevant idea that citizens of country i live and work in their home country, get paid
in local currency, and, whenever they have a need to purchase foreign goods, they exchange
local for foreign currency within a special institution known as the FOREX market. If agents
from country i were allowed to acquire money−i in CM−i (which, recall, is a perfectly competi-
tive market), this would defeat the very purpose of this paper, which is to explicitly model the
FOREX as an OTC market characterized by bilateral trade and intermediation.
We have also seen that only moneyi serves as a MOE in DMi. Strictly speaking, this is a
result rather than an assumption of the model, and it follows directly from the assumption that
sellers i cannot visit CM−i (see footnote 7), which, in turn, is adopted for the reasons described
in the previous paragraph. However, we do not claim that our paper offers a “deep” theory of
which assets serve as MOE in various types of international meetings, because this is not the
question that we are after. Zhang (2014) asks precisely this question (among others) and shows
that, if sellers must pay a relatively high cost to verify the genuineness of foreign currency (an
assumption which is quite reasonable), then a “local currency dominance” equilibrium, where
moneyi serves exclusively as a MOE in DMi, will arise endogenously.
In our model, intermediation in the FOREX market arises because direct currency trade be-
tween buyers from the two countries is difficult. One can think of buyer i as a Swiss importer
10 This assumption is new even within the class of models that employ two-country versions of LW. For instance,
Geromichalos and Simonovska (2014) interpret CMi as an analogue of E-trade, where agents from all over the
world can purchase assets of country i. In Zhang (2014), there is only oneCM , in which agents from both countries
trade the two currencies. In other words, in Zhang (2014), the CM is the FOREX market.
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of US computers, and buyer −i as an American importer of Swiss chocolate. Since the former
agent wishes to transform Swiss francs into dollars and the latter wishes to purchase Swiss
francs with her dollars, it seems like the two agents could carry out a mutually beneficial cur-
rency trade. However, contacting each other and carrying out this trade is clearly difficult for
the two buyers in our example.11 In this environment, the buyers are happy to purchase foreign
currency from FOREX dealers, and the dealers can charge an intermediation fee which reflects
their ability to access a well-networked (and practically competitive) interdealer market, and,
hence, bypass the frictions that prevent direct trade between currency buyers.12
This discussion clarifies that the search frictions, which play a central role in our analysis,
refer to the difficulty of agent i to contact agent −i and purchase foreign currency directly from
her, and not (necessarily) to the difficulty of agent i to contact a dealer. The latter is simply cap-
tured by the parameter αi ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, if a buyer of currency can find a dealer fairly quickly,
in the context of our model, this would imply a large value of αi.13 It is also important to clarify
that trade among dealers is not characterized by any frictions whatsoever (dealers trade with
each other in a perfectly competitive interdealer market). This is precisely why our model pre-
dicts the existence of positive bid-ask spreads in dealer-customer transactions, but no spreads
in interdealer transactions, which is consistent with the empirical observation (for instance, see
Lyons (2001)).
To conclude this section, we briefly discuss how two of the most important parameters of
the model, namely αi and θ, map into the real-world FOREX market. As we have already
described, αi captures the degree of dealer availability in that market. Therefore, one can in-
terpret the recent emergence of many online FOREX dealers and multilateral trading facilities
(MTFs) as an increase in αi.14 The term θ stands for the bargaining power of the dealers in a
typical buyer-dealer match. Hence, generally speaking, this parameter reflects the negotiating
strength of the dealers, but, more specifically, it can be thought of as a shortcut for capturing
certain market conditions which we have not explicitly modeled. For instance, in our model the
11 Even if the search friction per se is not immense enough to preclude contact between the two parties, there
are other reasons, such as the asymmetric demand for foreign currencies, that can render such trade difficult. For
instance, even if it is relatively easy for the two buyers to contact each other, say, through the internet, it might
still be the case that the Swiss importer of computers seeks to purchase 10 million US dollars, while the American
importer of chocolate only wants to convert 100,000 USD into Swiss francs. In this case, the Swiss importer would
have to search for multiple trading partners, which would make the overall transaction complicated.
12 Here, for the sake of simplicity, we have assumed that currency trade between buyers from the two countries
is impossible. However, all one needs to assume in order to generate a role for intermediation in the FOREX market,
is that direct trade between these agents is (just) difficult. For instance, one could assume that the C-type buyer i
first attempts to trade directly with buyer −i, and then, if that attempt proves unsuccessful, she resorts to dealers’
services. This alternative specification would make the analysis more cumbersome, but it would not add any
interesting insights to the model.
13 In fact, most of the results of the paper would remain valid even in the extreme case with αi = 1. This is true
because setting αi = 1 does not imply that we are in a “frictionless” environment, since, as we just explained, the
friction here concerns the difficulty to buy currency directly from foreign agents and not the availability of dealers.
14 Examples of such online dealers include FXall, Atriax, FXchange, FXconnect, FXtrade, Gain.com, Match-
bookFX, FOREX, LMAX.com, and others.
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measure of dealers is fixed, however, θ may capture the degree of competition for customers
among dealers (i.e., a low θ can be interpreted as a market where many dealers compete for
few currency customers). Similarly, in our model we have excluded direct currency trade be-
tween buyers from different countries (see footnote 12), however, θ may capture the degree to
which it is possible for buyer i to contact (and directly trade with) buyer −i (i.e., a high θ can
be interpreted as a market where direct trade between ultimate buyers and sellers of currency
is extremely difficult).
3 Value Functions and Optimal Behavior
3.1 Value Functions
Consider first the typical buyer i, who enters CMi with mi units of home currency. For this
agent, the Bellman’s equation satisfies15
WBi (mi) = max
X,H,m̂i
{
X −H + βEk{Ωki (m̂i)}
}
s.t. X + ϕim̂i = H + ϕimi + Ti,
where variables with a hat indicate next period’s choices. The term ϕi denotes the price of
moneyi in terms of the general good, and Ti is the real value of the lump-sum monetary transfer
by the monetary authority of country i. The function Ωki represents the value function in the
FOREX market for a buyer of type k = C,N . Eliminating H from the budget constraint yields
WBi (mi) = W
B
i (0) + ϕimi, (1)
WBi (0) ≡ Ti + max
m̂i
{−ϕim̂i + βEk{Ωki (m̂i)}} , k ∈ {C,N}.
As is standard in models that build on LW, the buyer’s value function is linear in the money
holdings, implying that there are no wealth effects on the choice of m̂i.
Next, consider the CM value function for the typical seller i. This agent will never want
15 A buyer who acquired some foreign currency in the FOREX market of period t, may fear that she might not
be able to trade again in that market in t+ 1 (given the search frictions). Hence, she might choose to not spend all
of her foreign currency in the DM of period t, but instead keep some to trade in the DM of t + 1. The problem
with this type of strategy is that, if buyers (in period t) can keep some foreign currency to trade in the DM of
t + 1, they can do the same for the DM of t + 2, t + 3, and so on. Allowing this type of strategy would make the
model intractable. Hence, we require that buyers spend all the foreign currency acquired in the FOREX market of
period t in the DM of that period. This implies that as these agents enter their home CM they can only hold home
currency. Although here, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that buyers must spend all their foreign currency in
the current DM , as long as the probability of meeting a dealer, αi, is large enough, buyers will actually choose to
do so. In other words, under certain (and quite reasonable) parameter values, the assumption in question would
arise endogenously as a result.
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to leave the CM with any money holdings, since she does not want to consume in the DM
round of trade (see Rocheteau and Wright (2005) for a rigorous proof). The seller will typically
hold some home currency, which she received as payment (either from a local or from a foreign
buyer) in the DM . For this agent, the Bellman’s equation satisfies
W Si (mi) = max
X,H
{
X −H + βV Si (0)
}
s.t. X = H + ϕimi,
where V Si (0) denotes the seller’s value function in DMi. Replacing H from the budget con-
straint into W Si yields
W Si (mi) = βV
S
i (0) + ϕimi.
A dealer is the only type of agent who might enter the third subperiod with a portfolio that
contains both currencies, m ≡ (mA,mB). For this agent, the Bellman’s equation satisfies
WD(m) = max
X,H,m̂
{X −H + βΩD(m̂)}
s.t. X +ϕm̂ = H +ϕm,
where ΩD(m̂) denotes value function of a dealer who enters the FOREX market with portfolio
m̂. Also, we define ϕ ≡ (ϕA, ϕB), and we let ϕm denote the dot product of ϕ and m. Eliminat-
ing H from the budget constraint implies that
WD(m) = WD(0) +ϕm, (2)
WD(0) ≡ max
m̂
{−ϕm̂ + βΩD(m̂)} .
Before we proceed to the description of the FOREX market value functions, we introduce
two useful definitions. First, let W˜D(m) denote the continuation value of a dealer who just (op-
timally) rebalanced her portfolio, m, in the interdealer FOREX market. This function satisfies
W˜D(m) = max
m˜
WD(m˜) (3)
s.t. m˜A + εm˜B ≤ mA + εmB,
where m˜ ≡ (m˜A, m˜B) denotes the post-interdealer market portfolio of the dealer, and the con-
straint requires that the value of the post-interdealer market portfolio (measured in terms of
moneyA) cannot exceed the value of the pre-interdealer market portfolio. Note that ε is defined
as the price of moneyB in terms of moneyA in the interdealer FOREX market. Hence, an increase
(decrease) in ε is equivalent to a depreciation of moneyA (moneyB).
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Second, consider a meeting between a dealer who enters the FOREX market with portfolio
md and a buyer from country i who carries mi units of home currency. Then, the terms[
m¯iA (mi, ε,ϕ) , m¯
i
B (mi, ε,ϕ)
]
,[
m¯dA
(
md,mi, ε,ϕ
)
, m¯dB
(
md,mi, ε,ϕ
)]
denote the portfolios that the buyer and the dealer (respectively) hold after all FOREX trading
has concluded (i.e., it includes the buyer-dealer trade and the interdealer market trade).16
Now consider the expected FOREX value function for the tyipcal buyer i who enters the
first subperiod with mi units of home currency. This functions satisfies
Ek{Ωki (mi)} = δΩCi (mi) + (1− δ)V ni (mi), (4)
where ΩCi (mi) denotes the FOREX value function for a buyer i who gets to consume the foreign
special good in the forthcoming DM−i, and V ni (mi) denotes the value function for a buyer i
who proceeds to DMi with her original (home) money holdings. Furthermore, we have
ΩCi (mi) =αiV
y
i
(
m¯iA, m¯
i
B
)
+ (1− αi)V ni (mi), (5)
where V ni has been explained earlier, and V
y
i (m¯
i
A, m¯
i
B) denotes theDM value function for buyer
i, conditional on having met with a dealer in the preceding FOREX market.
The value fuunction for a dealer who enters the FOREX market with portfolio md satisfies17
ΩD(m
d) =(1− αD)W˜D(md) (6)
+
αD
2
∫
W˜D
(
m¯dA
(
md,mA, ε,ϕ
)
, m¯dB
(
md,mA, ε,ϕ
))
dFA (mA)
+
αD
2
∫
W˜D
(
m¯dA
(
md,mB, ε,ϕ
)
, m¯dB
(
md,mB, ε,ϕ
))
dFB (mB) ,
where F i is the cumulative distribution function over the moneyi holdings of the random buyer
i whom the dealer may contact in the FOREX market.
Finally, consider the value functions in the DM round. For a C-type buyer i who matched
16 The exact solutions for the post-trade portfolios will be rigorously analyzed in Section 3.2. For now, we use
the terms m¯iA and m¯
i
A (mi, ε,ϕ), or m¯
d
A and m¯
d
A
(
md,mi, ε,ϕ
)
, etc., interchangeably.
17 As we have already explained, the various W˜D terms denote the continuation value for a dealer who rebal-
ances her portfolio in the interdealer FOREX market. However, the composition of that portfolio critically depends
on whether the dealer matched with a buyer, and, if yes, on the buyer’s citizenship and her money holdings. So,
for example, the first line on the RHS of eq.(6) describes the event in which the dealer does not contact any buyer
and proceeds to the interdealer market with her original portfolio, md. The second line describes the event in
which the dealer contacts a buyer from country A, in which case she proceeds to the interdealer market with
portfolio (m¯dA
(
md,mA, ε,ϕ
)
, m¯dB
(
md,mA, ε,ϕ
)
) (the third line admits a similar interpretation).
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with a dealer in the preceding FOREX market and carries a portfolio (mA,mB), we have18
V yi (mA,mB) = u(q) + u(q˜) +W
B
i (mi − p) , (7)
where q (q˜) denotes the consumption of local (foreign) special good, and p the units of moneyi
that the buyer transfers to seller i in DMi. These terms will be determined in Section 3.2. Fur-
thermore, for the typical buyer i who only participates in her home DM (either because she is
an N-type or because she did not contact a dealer in the FOREX market), we have
V ni (mi) = u(q) +W
B
i (mi − p) . (8)
The DM value function for seller i, who enters DMi with no money, is given by
V Si =
1
1 + δ
[−q +W Si (p)]+ δα−i1 + δ [−q˜ +W Si (p˜)]+ δ(1− α−i)1 + δ W Si (0) , (9)
where q, p denote the production of special good, and the units of moneyi exchanged in a meet-
ing with a local buyer, and q˜, p˜ are the analogue expressions for a meeting with a foreign buyer.
The expression δ(1 − α−i)/(1 + δ) in the third term on the RHS of eq.(9) is the probability with
which the seller does not match with a buyer, in which case she proceeds toCMi with no money.
3.2 Terms of Trade
In this section, we study the determination of the terms of trade in the various markets. First,
consider a meeting inDMi between a seller i and a buyer i (a local) who carriesmi units of local
currency. The two parties negotiate over a quantity of special good, q, to be produced, and an
amount of moneyi, p, to be delivered to the seller. Given that the buyer makes a TIOLI offer to
the seller, the bargaining problem can be expressed as19
max
p,q
{u(q) +WBi (mi − p)−WBi (mi)}
s.t. q = W Si (p)−W Si (0),
18 As we have already argued, the buyer will spend all her foreign currency in DM−i, hence, the only argument
inside WBi is home money holdings.
19 At this stage the buyer has already made her portfolio decisions (i.e., how much home currency to keep and
how much to exchange for foreign currency). Hence, all that matters for the bargaining problem is the buyer’s
local money holdings, and not whether she is a C or an N-type and/or whether she traded in the FOREX market.
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and the feasibility constraint p ≤ mi. Given the linearity of WBi ,W Si , the problem simplifies to
max
p,q
{u(q)− ϕip}
s.t. q = ϕip,
and p ≤ mi. The next lemma describes the solution to this bargaining problem.
Lemma 1. Define q∗ = {q : u′(q) = 1} andm∗i = q∗/ϕi. Then, in aDMi meeting between a seller i and
a local buyer, the bargaining solution is given by q(mi) = min{ϕimi, q∗} and p(mi) = min{mi,m∗i }.
Proof. The proof is obvious, and it is, therefore, omitted.
The interpretation of Lemma 1 is standard. The terms of trade, (q, p), depend only on the
buyer’s moneyi holdings. When mi exceeds a certain level, m∗i , the buyer purchases the first-
best quantity, q∗, and gives up exactly m∗i units of moneyi. On the other hand, if mi falls short
of m∗i , the buyer is liquidity constrained. In this case, she gives up all her moneyi, and receives
the amount of good that the seller is willing to produce for that money, i.e., q = ϕimi.
Next, consider a DMi meeting between a seller i and a buyer −i (a foreigner) who carries
mi units of moneyi (which to her is foreign currency acquired in the preceding FOREX market).
The two parties negotiate over a quantity of special good, q˜, to be produced, and an amount of
moneyi, p˜, to be delivered to the seller. In this type of meeting, the determination of the terms
of trade is even more straightforward than before, because the buyer spends all her moneyi by
assumption (see footnote 15). The solution to this bargaining problem follows trivially.
Lemma 2. In a DMi meeting between a seller i and a foreign buyer, the bargaining solution is given by
q˜(mi) = ϕimi and p˜(mi) = mi.
We now proceed to the characterization of the terms of trade in the FOREX market. Consider
first a dealer who enters the FOREX market with a portfolio md and does not match with a
buyer. This dealer can still participate in the interdealer market and potentially sell her money
to dealers who want to acquire it (e.g., because they matched with C-type buyers). The next
lemma describes the continuation value of this agent.
Lemma 3. A dealer who enters the first sub-period with portfolio md, and does not contact any buyer,
enters the third sub-period with portfolio m˜d ≡ (m˜dA (md, ε,ϕ) , m˜dB (md, ε,ϕ)), given by
m˜dA =

0, if εϕA < ϕB,
∈ [0,mdA + εmdB], if εϕA = ϕB,
mdA + εm
d
B, if εϕA > ϕB.
m˜dB =

mdB +m
d
A/ε, if εϕA < ϕB,
mdB + (m
d
B − m˜dA)/ε, if εϕA = ϕB,
0, if εϕA > ϕB.
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Moreover, the dealer’s maximum expected discounted payoff is
W˜D(md) = ϕ¯
(
mdA + εm
d
B
)
+WD(0), (10)
where ϕ¯ ≡ max{ϕA, ϕB/ε}.
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 3 admits an intuitive interpretation. If εϕA < ϕB, then a dealer who holds any
moneyA in the interdealer FOREX market can use a unit of moneyA to buy 1/ε units of moneyB.
The net return of this trading strategy is ϕB/ε− ϕA, which is strictly positive. Therefore, under
these prices, the typical dealer will sell all her moneyA for moneyB in the interdealer market.
The same intuition applies to the complementary case (i.e., when εϕA > ϕB). When εϕA = ϕB,
the dealer is indifferent with respect to the composition of her portfolio (between moneyA and
moneyB). As we shall see later, this case is the only one that can arise in equilibrium.
We now study the bargaining outcome in a meeting between a C-type buyer i and a dealer
in the FOREX market. Since the buyer has an opportunity to consume special good in DM−i,
she may want to exchange some of her moneyi for money−i. In turn, dealers, have the unique
ability to access the frictionless interdealer market, where they can acquire money−i from other
dealers, who either contacted buyers from country −i or carry money−i on their own account.
Hence, in this type of bilateral meeting there are clear gains from trade, and the two parties will
split the surplus according to Kalai’s proportional bargaining solution (with θ ∈ (0, 1) being the
dealer’s bargaining power).20 The bargaining problem is given by
max
m¯dA,m¯
d
B ,m¯
i
A,m¯
i
B≥0
{
W˜D(m¯d)− W˜D(md)
}
s.t. 1.
θ
1− θ =
W˜D(m¯d)− W˜D(md)
V yi (m¯
i)− V ni (mii)
,
2. m¯dA + m¯
i
A + ε[m¯
d
B + m¯
i
B] ≤ mdA +miAI{i=A} + ε
[
mdB +m
i
BI{i=B}
]
,
where m¯d ≡ (m¯dA, m¯dB) , m¯i ≡ (m¯iA, m¯iB) denote the post-FOREX trade portfolio for the dealer
and the buyer, respectively, and I{i=n}, n ∈ {A,B}, is an indicator function that equals 1 if i = n.
As is standard with proportional bargaining, the problem above maximizes the dealer’s
surplus (i.e., her post-negotiation continuation value net of her threat point), subject to two
constraints. The first is the so-called Kalai constraint, which requires the dealer-to-buyer surplus
ratio to equal the ratio of the two players’ bargaining powers (i.e., θ/(1 − θ)). The second is
the feasibility constraint which requires that the combined value of the pre-trade portfolios is
20 For a discussion on the benefits of using Kalai’s (1977) over Nash Jr’s (1950) bargaining solution in monetary
theory, see Aruoba, Rocheteau, and Waller (2007).
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enough to finance the combined value of the post-trade portfolios in the interdealer market.
Exploiting the linearity of the value functions the problem simplifies to
max
m¯dA,m¯
d
B ,m¯
i
A,m¯
i
B≥0
{
ϕ¯
[
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B − (mdA + εmdB)
]}
st. 1.
θ
1− θ =
ϕ¯
[
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B − (mdA + εmdB)
]
u (q (m¯ii)) + u
(
q˜
(
m¯i−i
))− u (q (mii)) + ϕi [p(mii)− p(m¯ii)− (mii − m¯ii)] ,
2. m¯dA + m¯
i
A + ε[m¯
d
B + m¯
i
B] ≤ mdA +miAI{i=A} + ε
[
mdB +m
i
BI{i=B}
]
.
The solution to this bargaining problem is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider the bargaining problem between a buyer i and a dealer, who enter the first subperiod
with portfolios mii and md, respectively. Moreover, define the following objects:
χ∗−i ≡
{
χ−i : u′ (ϕ−iχ−i) =
(ϕAε) I{i=A} + ϕBI{i=B}
ϕBI{i=A} + (ϕAε) I{i=B}
}
, (11)
G(χ−i) ≡
{
G(χ−i) :
ϕ−iu′ (ϕ−iχ−i)
ϕiu′ (ϕiG(χ−i))
=
ϕ¯I{i=B} + ϕ¯εI{i=A}
ϕ¯εI{i=B} + ϕ¯I{i=A}
}
, (12)
τi(χ−i) ≡ θu (ϕ−iχ−i) + (1− θ)ϕ¯χ−i[εI{i=A} + I{i=B}]
θϕi + (1− θ)ϕ¯[εI{i=B} + I{i=A}] . (13)
We have the following results:
a) The buyer’s post-FOREX trade portfolio, m¯i, is given by
m¯i−i
(
mii
)
=

χ∗−i, if mii ≥ m∗i + τi(χ∗−i),
{χ−i : mii = Γ (χ−i)} , if m∗i ≤ mii ≤ m∗i + τi(χ∗−i),
{χ−i : mii = Λ (χ−i)} , if mii ≤ m∗i ,
m¯ii
(
mii
)
=
mii − τi(χ∗−i), if mii ≥ m∗i + τi(χ∗−i),G (m¯i−i (mii)) , otherwise,
where we have defined
Γ (χ−i) ≡ G(χ−i) + τi(χ−i) + θ {u (ϕiG(χ−i))− ϕiG(χ−i)} − θ {u (q
∗
i )− q∗i }
θϕi + (1− θ)ϕ¯[εI{i=B} + I{i=A}] ,
Λ (χ−i) ≡ G(χ−i) + θ {u (ϕ−iχ−i) + u (ϕiG(χ−i))− u (ϕim
i
i)}+ (1− θ)ϕ¯χ−i[εI{i=A} + I{i=B}]
(1− θ)ϕ¯[εI{i=B} + I{i=A}] .
Also, we have Γ′ (χ−i) > 0, Λ′ (χ−i) > 0.
b) Define the “ask” and the “bid” price of moneyB as follows:
X εa ≡ the price of moneyB in terms of moneyA that a dealer asks buyer A to pay for moneyB.
17
X εb ≡ the price of moneyB in terms of moneyA that a dealer bids to buyer B to buy moneyB.
Then, we have εa = m
A
A−m¯AA
m¯AB
, εb = m¯
B
A
mBB−m¯BB
, and εb ≤ ε ≤ εa.
c) The dealer’s post-FOREX trade portfolio,
(
m¯dA, m¯
d
B
)
, is given by
m¯dA ∈
(
0,mdA + εm
d
B +
(
(εa − ε) I{i=A} +
(
ε− εb
εb
)
I{i=B}
)
m¯i−i
)
,
m¯dB =
1
ε
(
mdA + εm
d
B +
(
(εa − ε) I{i=A} +
(
ε− εb
εb
)
I{i=B}
)
m¯i−i − m¯dA
)
.
Proof. See the appendix.
The formal proof of the lemma has been relegated to the appendix. Here, we provide an
intuitive description of the solution. When buyer i gives up one unit of moneyi, this typically
reduces the amount of good, say q, that she can purchase in DMi, but also allows her to acquire
money−i, which she can use to purchase good, say q˜, in DM−i. This transaction will undoubt-
edly create a benefit, or surplus, because the buyer’s preferences in the DM round are given
by u(q) + u(q˜), with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and u′(0) = ∞.21 The proportional bargaining solution first
makes sure that the surplus generated by the transaction (i.e., the transfer of money−i to buyer
i) is maximized, and then determines the terms of trade so that the so-called Kalai constraint is
satisfied (this last part simply means that the dealer obtains a fraction θ of the surplus).
A key observation from Lemma 4 is that the solution to the bargaining problem depends
only on the buyer’s pre-trade moneyi holdings, mii. Hence, it turns out that the key contribution
of the dealer in this match is her ability to access the interdealer market, and not the fact that
she may be carrying some money on her own account. Technically speaking, this is attributed
to the fact that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) betweenmoneyA andmoneyB for dealers
is exogenously pinned down by the currency prices in the (perfectly competitive) interdealer
FOREX market (i.e., the terms ε,ϕ on the right-hand side of eq.(12)).
Before we explain the solution to the bargaining problem we provide an intuitive interpre-
tation of the various terms that appear in Lemma 4. The term χ−i stands for the units of foreign
currency that buyer i holds after the FOREX meeting, and χ∗−i is the amount of foreign currency
that allows buyer i to purchase the first best quantity in DM−i. The term G(χ−i) stands for the
post-FOREX amount of moneyi held by buyer i, and it is defined in eq.(12), which states that
surplus maximization requires that the MRS between moneyi and money−i for the buyer (left-
hand side of the equation in the curly bracket) should be equal to the MRS between moneyi and
money−i for the dealer (right-hand side of the equation in the curly bracket). The term τi(χ∗−i)
21 Hence, if q˜ = 0 and q > 0, there is always a benefit from reducing q and increasing q˜. In fact, for q˜ ≈ 0 the
marginal benefit of increasing q˜ is infinite, as it follows from the Inada condition.
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stands for the units of moneyi that the buyer needs to carry in addition to m∗i in order to pur-
chase the first best quantity in both DMs. Naturally, this term is increasing both in χ∗−i and θ.22
Finally, the terms Γ (χ−i) ,Λ (χ−i) have been defined such that the equations mii = Γ (χ−i) and
mii = Λ (χ−i) represent the Kalai constraint (for different levels of mii).23
Given this discussion, the interpretation of Lemma 4 becomes quite intuitive. Given her
money holdings, mii, the buyer can find herself in three possible regions.
1. mii ≥ m∗i + τi
(
χ∗−i
)
.
In this region, the buyer’s moneyi holdings are so plentiful that she ends up purchasing
the first best quantity in both DM ′s. This requires that the buyer’s post-FOREX money−i
holdings equal χ∗−i, and her post-FOREX moneyi holdings equal her original holdings, mii,
net of the term τi(χ∗−i) described in the previous paragraph.
2. m∗i ≤ mii ≤ m∗i + τi(χ∗−i).
In this intermediate region, the buyer can afford to purchase q∗ in her home DM but not
in both DMs. Of course, the buyer could choose to keep m∗i units of moneyi, which would
allow her to purchase q∗ in DMi, but optimality requires that the MRS between moneyi
and money−i for the buyer should be equal to the MRS between moneyi and money−i for
the dealer. Put simply, the post-FOREX moneyi and money−i holdings of the buyer are
pinned down by eq.(12) and the equation mii = Γ (χ−i) (i.e., the Kalai constraint).
3. mii ≤ m∗i .
In this region, the buyer’s pre-trade money holdings are so scarce that she cannot even
afford to purchase q∗ in the home DM . The interpretation of the bargaining solution is
similar to the one in Region 2: the buyer’s post-FOREX moneyi and money−i holdings are
pinned down by eq.(12) and the Kalai constraint. However, given that we are in the case
where mii ≤ m∗i , the relevant Kalai constraint is now given by the equation mii = Λ (χ−i).
Part (b) of the lemma simply determines the bid and ask price of the dealer (in terms ofmoneyB)
22 The more money−i the buyer wishes to acquire, the more moneyi she should bring. Moreover, when θ is
higher the transaction fee charged by the dealer is higher, thus, to acquire a given amount of money−i the buyer
should, on average, bring more moneyi.
23 To see this point, focus on the equation mii = Γ (χ−i) (an analogous argument applies to the second equation).
Also, to simplify the illustration here, set εϕA = ϕB (which, of course, will hold in equilibrium, and) which implies
that the term ϕ¯[εI{i=B}+I{i=A}], which appears in Γ (χ−i), simplifies to ϕi, ∀i. Multiply both sides by ϕi and solve
with respect to ϕimii − ϕiG(χ−i), to obtain
ϕim
i
i − ϕiG(χ−i) =ϕ−iχ−i
+θ {[u(ϕiG(χ−i))− ϕiG(χi)] + [u(ϕ−iχ−i)− ϕ−iχ−i]− [u(q∗)− q∗]} .
This equation states that the dealer should leave the meeting with an amount of moneyi (the LHS of the equation)
whose value equals the value of the money−i that she brings into the match either through intermediation or on
her own account (the term ϕ−iχ−i), plus a fraction θ of the surplus generated when ϕ−iχ−i (real) units of foreign
currency are transferred to the buyer (the second line in the equation).
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as functions of the post and pre-trade money holdings of buyer i. Part (c) describes the dealer’s
post-trade portfolio, which turns out to be indeterminate. This follows from the fact that the
dealer can visit both CMs (and sell the currencies for general good), so there is a continuum
of portfolio allocations that give her the same payoff. Nevertheless, as the following corollary
shows, the combined value of the dealer’s post-trade portfolio is uniquely pinned down.
Corollary 1. The moneyA value of the dealer’s post-trade portfolio is uniquely given by
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B = m
d
A + εm
d
B +
(
(εa − ε) I{i=A} +
(
ε− εb
εb
)
I{i=B}
)
m¯i−i.
Corollary 1 also clarifies that the dealer extracts a transaction fee from the buyer. For ex-
ample, when the dealer encounters a buyer A who purchases m¯AB units of foreign currency, she
extracts a total fee equal to (εa − ε) m¯AB. Similarly, when the dealer encounters a buyer B who
purchases m¯BA of foreign currency, she extracts a total fee equal to
[
(ε− εb)/εb] m¯BA .
The following lemma highlights some interesting properties of certain key variables that
can be calculated directly from the bargaining solution (Lemma 4), such as the ask and bid price
of moneyB, and the amount of currency that changes hands. These terms will be crucial for the
determination of the equilibrium bid-ask spread and FOREX trade volume later on.
Lemma 5. The Ask and Bid Price satisfy
∂εa
∂θ
> 0,
∂εb
∂θ
< 0,
∂εa
∂mAA
= 0, in Region 1,< 0, in Region 2,3, ∂ε
b
∂mBB
= 0, in Region 1,> 0, in Region 2,3.
The Volume of money−i the dealer hands over satisfies
∂m¯i−i
∂θ
= 0, in Region 1,< 0, in Region 2,3, ∂m¯
i
−i
∂mii
= 0, in Region 1,> 0, in Region 2,3.
The Volume of moneyi the buyer i hands over satisfies
∂ (mii − m¯ii)
∂θ
> 0, in Region 1,> 0, in Region 2,3, ∂ (m
i
i − m¯ii)
∂mii
= 0, in Region 1,> 0, in Region 2,3.
Proof. See the appendix.
These results admit an intuitive interpretation. When the dealer’s bargaining power θ in-
creases, other things equal, the dealer extracts a larger fraction of the surplus, so that the bid
price decreases and the ask price increases (and so does the spread between the two). More-
over, when θ is higher, the dealer hands over less money−i to buyer i for any given moneyii , with
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the exception of Region 1, where the buyer is not constrained by her home money holdings.24
Naturally, the volume of moneyi that buyer i hands over to the dealer is increasing in θ. The
effects of an increase in mii work in the opposite way than an increase in θ. An increase in mii
typically allows the buyer to purchase more (home and) foreign good, but since u is concave,
her marginal benefit from acquiring one additional unit of foreign currency, or, equivalently,
from consuming one additional unit of foreign good, is diminishing. In a sense, an increase
in mii makes buyer i less eager to acquire foreign currency, and effectively allows her to obtain
better terms of trade in the FOREX market. Finally, with the exception of Region 1, the more
moneyi the buyer carries, the more she hands over to the dealer, due to the fact that the increase
in m¯i−i more than offsets the improvement in the terms of trade, i.e., the decrease in εa.
3.3 Optimal Behavior
In this section, we describe the optimal portfolio choices of buyers and dealers. The first step is
to characterize the objective functions for these agents. First, consider the typical dealer. Substi-
tute eq.(10) into eq.(6), and lead the emerging expression by one period to obtain
ΩD
(
m̂d
)
= ̂¯ϕ(m̂dA + ε̂m̂dB) +WD(0̂)
+ ̂¯ϕ∫ αD
2
[εa (m̂A)− ε̂] m¯AB (m̂A) dFA (m̂A)
+ ̂¯ϕ ∫ αD
2
[
ε̂− εb (m̂B)
εb (m̂B)
]
m¯BA (m̂B) dF
B (m̂B) .
Next, substitute ΩD from the last expression into eq.(2), and define the term inside the max
operator (i.e., the objective function) as JD. Then, we have
JD
(
m̂dA, m̂
d
B
) ≡ (−ϕA + β ̂¯ϕ) m̂dA + (−ϕB + β ̂¯ϕε̂) m̂dB
+ β ̂¯ϕ ∫ αD
2
[εa (m̂A)− ε̂] m¯AB (m̂A) dFA (m̂A)
+ β ̂¯ϕ ∫ αD
2
[
ε̂− εb (m̂B)
εb (m̂B)
]
m¯BA (m̂B) dF
B (m̂B) .
In the last expression, the fist line represents the cost of carrying moneyA and moneyB, the sec-
ond line captures the expected discounted benefit from executing buyerA’s order (i.e., purchas-
ing moneyB) in the interdealer market, and the last line admits a similar interpretation (when
the dealer meets a buyerB). As we already know from Lemma 4, these expected intermediation
fees are independent of the dealer’s own portfolio. Also, it is understood that the expressions
24 However, for a given mii, increasing θ makes it more likely that the bargaining solution will “fall” in Region 2.
Hence, this statement implicitly assumes that the change in θ is such that we are still in the interior of Region 1.
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m¯i−i, ε
a, and εb are described by Lemma 4.
Next, consider the typical buyer i. Substitute equations (7), (8) into (5), and then plug the
emerging expression into eq.(4) and lead it by one period to obtain
Ek{Ωki (m̂i)} =ϕ̂im̂i +WBi (0̂)
+ δαi
{
u
(
q˜i
(
m¯i−i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂)
))
+ u (qi (m̂i − ϑ (m̂i)))
}
− δαi [ϕ̂iϑ (m̂i) + ϕ̂ipi (m̂i − ϑ (m̂i))]
+ (1− δαi) {u (qi (m̂i)) + ϕ̂i [m̂i − pi (m̂i)]} ,
where ϑ (m̂i) represents the units of moneyi that buyer i hands over to the dealer.25 To obtain
buyer i’s objective function, substitute Ek{Ωki (m̂i)} from the last expression into eq.(1). We have
J i (m̂i) ≡ (−ϕi + βϕ̂i) m̂i (14)
+ βδαi
{
u
(
q˜i
(
m¯i−i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂)
))
+ u (qi (m̂i − ϑ (m̂i)))
}
− βδαi [ϕ̂iϑ (m̂i) + ϕ̂ipi (m̂i − ϑ (m̂i))]
+ β (1− δαi) {u (qi (m̂i)) + ϕ̂i [m̂i − pi (m̂i)]} .
In the last expression, the first line represents the buyer’s net benefit from holding m̂i units of
local money until the end of the next period, and the remaining terms represent the expected
net gain from (potential) trade. More precisely, the second line stands for the expected utility
gain in the forthcoming DMs, if the buyer is a C-type and matches with a dealer. The third
line represents the cost from giving up some of her moneyi to a dealer (the first term inside the
square bracket) and to a seller i (the second term inside the square bracket), in the same event.
Finally, the fourth line represents the buyer’s net benefit in the event that she does not trade in
the FOREX market (either because she is an N-type or because she did not match with a dealer).
The terms qi(·), q˜−i(·), and pi(·) are described by the solutions to the DM bargaining problems.
Before we proceed to the description of agents’ optimal behavior, the following auxiliary
lemma describes some important properties of the buyer’s objective function.
Lemma 6. Define J ir (m̂i) as buyer i′s objective function, when her money holdings, m̂i, are such that
the relevant region in the buyer-dealer FOREX bargaining solution is r = {1, 2, 3}. Then, we have:
∂J i1 (m̂i)
∂m̂i
=− ϕi + βϕ̂i, (15)
25 In particular, ϑ (m̂i) = ε̂a (m̂i) m¯i−i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂) I{i=A} + m¯i−i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂) /ε̂b (m̂i) I{i=B}.
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∂J i2 (m̂i)
∂m̂i
=− ϕi + βϕ̂i (16)
+ βδαiϕ̂−iu′
(
ϕ̂−im¯i−i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂)
) ∂ (m¯i−i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂))
∂m̂i
+ βδαiϕ̂i
{
u′
(
ϕ̂im¯
i
i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂)
) ∂ (m¯ii (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂))
∂m̂i
− 1
}
,
∂J i3 (m̂i)
∂m̂i
=− ϕi + βϕ̂i (17)
+ βδαiϕ̂−iu′
(
ϕ̂−im¯i−i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂)
) ∂ (m¯i−i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂))
∂m̂i
+ βδαiϕ̂i
{
u′
(
ϕ̂im¯
i
i (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂)
) ∂ (m¯ii (m̂i, ε̂, ϕ̂))
∂m̂i
− 1
}
+ β(1− δαi)ϕ̂i {u′ (ϕ̂im̂i)− 1} .
Proof. Replacing qi, q˜i, and pi from Lemmas 1, 2, and obtaining the derivative with respect to
m̂i yields the desired result.
We are now ready to describe agents’ optimal behavior, starting with the typical dealer. It is
important to keep in mind that, in any equilibrium, the following two conditions must hold:26
ϕA ≥ βmax (ϕ̂A, ϕ̂B/ε̂) and ϕB ≥ βmax (ϕ̂Aε̂, ϕ̂B) . (18)
Lemma 7. Taking prices Ψ ≡ (ϕ, ϕ̂, ̂¯ϕ, ε, ε̂) as given, the optimal portfolio choice of the typical dealer,
m̂d, is as follows:
1. If ϕi = β ̂¯ϕ{ε̂I{i=B} + I{i=A}}, then m̂di ∈ R+.
2. If ϕi > β ̂¯ϕ{ε̂I{i=B} + I{i=A}}, then m̂di = 0.
Proof. The proof is trivial, it is, therefore, omitted.
The dealer’s money demand is simple. The dealer does not have a benefit from carrying
moneyi, since, as we have already established, the terms of trade in the FOREX meetings are
not affected by her money holdings. Thus, the dealer will typically choose to leave the CM
round of trade without any money, unless the cost of holding money is zero.
Next, consider the optimal portfolio choice of the typical buyer i.
Lemma 8. Taking prices Ψ ≡ (ϕ, ϕ̂, ̂¯ϕ, ε, ε̂) as given, the optimal portfolio choice of the typical buyer i,
m̂i, is as follows:
26 The proof of this claim is standard in monetary theory. If it was ϕA < βmax (ϕ̂A, ϕ̂B/ε̂), then dealers would
have an infinite demand for moneyA, which is clearly inconsistent with the existence of equilibrium.
23
1. If ϕi/βϕ̂i = 1, then m̂i = m∗i + τi
(
χ∗−i
)
.
2. If 1 < ϕi/βϕ̂i ≤ µ¯i, then there exits a unique optimal m̂i ∈
[
m∗i ,m
∗
i + τi
(
χ∗−i
))
, which satisfies
∂J i2 (m̂i)/∂m̂i = 0.
3. If ϕi/βϕ̂i ≥ µ¯i, then there exits a unique optimal m̂i ∈ (0,m∗i ], which satisfies ∂J i3 (m̂i)/∂m̂i = 0.
Proof. The proof and the definition of the term µ¯i are relegated to the appendix.
The typical buyer i’s money demand,Diε̂ , is plotted in Figure 2 (for some given ε̂) against the
ratio ϕi/ (βϕ̂i), which captures the cost of holding home money . The money demand curve has
a standard negative slope, but it also kinks at the point (m∗i , µ¯i). Intuitively, the term µ¯i (which
is shown to be greater than 1 in the appendix) captures the level of inflation that induces the
buyer to carry enough money in order to purchase q∗ in the home DM .27 When the cost of
holding money drops below µ¯i, the buyer carries an even greater amount of home currency, or,
in terms of the language introduced in Lemma 4, the relevant region of the FOREX bargaining
protocol switches from Region 3 to Region 2. The change in the slope of the demand function
around µ¯i captures the fact that the marginal benefit from carrying one more unit of money
differs between Regions 2 and 3. In both Regions 2 and 3, an additional unit of moneyi allows
buyer i to purchase more special good in DM−i if she trades in the FOREX market, a benefit
which is represented by the second and third lines in equations (16), (17). However, in Region
3, an additional unit of moneyi also allows the buyer to purchase more special good in DMi,
if she does not trade in the FOREX market. This benefit is represented by the fourth line in
eq.(17), and it does not have a counterpart in eq.(16), since in Region 2 the buyer is already able
to purchase the first-best quantity.
4 Equilibrium in the Two-Country Model
4.1 Definition of Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the steady state equilibrium of the model. Before stating the
formal definition, we introduce some additional notation. Let Admi and A
i
mi
denote the amount
of moneyi held by all dealers and all buyers i, respectively, at the beginning of the current
period. Also, let A˜dmi and A˜
i
mi
denote the amount of moneyi held by all dealers and all buyers
i, respectively, at the end of the preceding period. Finally, let A¯dmi , A¯
i
mi
, and A¯−imi denote the
27 In the standard one-country model, µ¯i would be equal to 1, i.e., the buyer would carry enough money to
purchase q∗ only if the cost of holding money is zero. However, here the buyer realizes that she might have
an opportunity to purchase the foreign good as well. Hence, if the cost of holding money is not too high (1 <
ϕi/βϕ̂i ≤ µ¯i), she will carry an amount of money that exceeds m∗i .
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ϕi
βϕ̂i
m∗i m
∗
i + τ
∗
i
1
µ¯i
Figure 2: moneyi demand by a buyer from country i
amount of moneyi held by all dealers, all buyers i, and all buyers −i who traded in the FOREX
market, respectively, after the current period’s FOREX trading has concluded. We have,
A¯dmi =(1− αD)v
∫
m˜di
(
md, ε,ϕ
)
dKd
(
md
)
+
αD
2
v
∫
m˜di
(
m¯d, ε,ϕ
)
dKd
(
md
)
dF i
(
mii
)
+
αD
2
v
∫
m˜di
(
m¯d, ε,ϕ
)
dKd
(
md
)
dF−i
(
m−i−i
)
,
A¯imi =αiδ
∫
m¯ii
(
mii, ε,ϕ
)
dF i
(
mii
)
,
A¯−imi =α−iδ
∫
m¯−ii
(
m−i−i, ε,ϕ
)
dF−i
(
m−i−i
)
,
where Kd is the cumulative distribution function over the portfolio held by the typical dealer
in the beginning of the current period.28 We are now ready to define a stationary equilibrium.
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium is a list of terms of trade in the DMs, the interdealer
28 Given the uniqueness of agents’ optimal choice (Lemmas 7, 8), the cdf ’s Kd, F i, F−i will be degenerate. Here,
we describe the variables A¯dmi , A¯
i
mi , A¯
−i
mi explicitly as functions of these cdf ’s only for the sake of generality.
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market, and the typical buyer-dealer FOREX meeting,
{
(pi, qi) , (p˜i, q˜i) , m˜
d, m¯d, m¯i, εa, εb
}
, i = {A,B} ,
given by Lemmas 1, 2, 3, and 4, together with a list of money holdings
{(
m̂dA, m̂
d
B
)
, m̂ii
}
, i = {A,B} ,
and prices, Ψ, such that:
• The money holdings, {(m̂dA, m̂dB) , m̂ii}, solve the individual optimization problems (1) and
(2), taking prices as given.
• Prices are such that all Walrasian markets (i.e., CM and interdealer FOREX market) clear:
– A˜dmi + A˜
i
mi
= Admi + A
i
mi
, i = {A,B}, (CMi),
– A¯dmi +A¯
i
mi
+A¯−imi = A
d
mi
+δαiA
i
mi
, i = {A,B} , (interdealer FOREX market formoneyi).
• The law of one price holds, i.e., no arbitrage conditions exist in the interdealer FOREX
market: ϕB = εϕA.
• Real moneyi balances for all i remain constant over time:
– ϕi/ϕ̂i = (Âdmi + Â
i
mi
)/(Admi + A
i
mi
) = γi, , i = {A,B},
– ε̂/ε = γA/γB.
Definition 1 reveals an important property of equilibrium. Due to the competitive nature
of the interdealer market, no arbitrage conditions can arise in equilibrium, i.e., we must have
ϕB = εϕA. Imposing this condition in eq.(12) (for i equal to A or B), implies that the buyer’s
post-FOREX trade (moneyi,money−i) holdings are such that she will purchase exactly the same
quantity of special good in the local and the foreign DM , i.e., in equilibrium, qi = q˜−i.29
In the next section, we will examine how the various equilibrium variables depend on the
policy parameters γi, γ−i, and the structural parameters θ, αi, αD, and δ. Before we proceed, no-
tice that the three regions introduced in the discussion following Lemma 4 have their “general
equilibrium” counterparts, i.e., they can be expressed in terms of equilibrium real balances held
by buyer i, Zi. More precisely, we will say that equilibrium is in Region 1, when Zi = q∗ + q˜∗,
where q˜∗ ≡ θu(q∗) + (1 − θ)q∗.30 In the intermediate Region 2, we will have Zi ∈ [q∗, q∗ + q˜∗).
Finally, Zi < q∗ means that equilibrium lies in Region 3.
29 For instance, letting i = A and substituting for ε = ϕB/ϕA in eq.(12) implies that ϕBχB = ϕAG(χB).
30 Since money is fiat there is never a point in carrying Zi > q∗ + q˜∗. Hence, Region 1 is a singleton rather than
an interval.
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4.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
4.2.1 International Trade
We are now ready to state the main results of the paper. Proposition 1 describes the effect of
changes in home inflation, γi, on the aggregateDM good consumption of country i. Proposition
2 describes the effect of changes in foreign inflation, γ−i, and the bargaining power of dealers, θ,
on the equilibrium exports and imports of country i. To simplify the presentation, throughout
Section 4.2.1 we assume, without loss of generality, that all agents get to consume the foreign
good and match with a dealer, i.e., we set δαi = 1, ∀i ∈ {A,B}.
Proposition 1. Define qTi as country i’s total consumption of special goods both in the local and the
foreign DM . We have the following results:
i) If θ > 0 (θ = 0), then Zi > qTi (Zi = qTi ), ∀γi.
ii) Constrained efficiency, i.e., qTi = 2q∗, requires that γi = β. Otherwise, qTi < 2q∗ and ∂qTi /∂γi < 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
Zi
qTi
γi
β γ¯i
Region 2 Region 3
2q∗
q∗ + q˜∗
q∗
Case 1: θ > 0
q∗ + q˜∗
q∗
2q∗
Case 2: θ = 0
Region 2 Region 3
Zi
qTi
γi
β γ¯i
Figure 3: Effects of γi on the country i’s DM goods consumption (qTi ) with δαi = 1
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. The amount of special goods that
buyers i can purchase in both DMs depends on the amount of real home money balances that
they carry. If θ > 0, Zi will exceed qTi , because some of the real balances that buyers carry will
end up in the pockets of dealers as intermediation fees. The first best will be achieved only if
the local monetary authority follows the Friedman rule, i.e., if γi = β. In any other case, DM
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consumption will fall short of the first best, i.e., qTi < 2q∗. Finally, since inflation acts as a tax on
holding home real balances, a higher γi reduces Zi and leads to a lower consumption of both
special goods. These results are depicted in Figure 3. The kink that both Zi and qTi exhibit at
γ¯i follows directly from the fact that the buyer’s money demand function also has a kink as we
move from Region 2 to Region 3 (see Figure 2 and the discussion following Lemma 8).
Proposition 2. Define q˜T−i as country i’s total exports, i.e., the total amount of special good that sellers
i sell to foreign buyers. Likewise, define q˜Ti as country i’s total imports, i.e., the total amount of special
good that buyers i purchase from foreign sellers. Finally, let Z−i denote the real money−i balances held
by buyers −i. We have the following results:
i) If θ > 0 (θ = 0), then Z−i > 2q˜T−i (Z−i = 2q˜T−i), ∀γ−i.
ii) The effects of foreign inflation, γ−i, on the imports and exports of country i satisfy:
∂q˜Ti
∂γ−i
= 0 and
∂q˜T−i
∂γ−i
< 0.
iii) An increase in γ−i reduces country i’s net exports.
iv) An increase in θ reduces the volume of international trade, i.e., ∂q˜Ti /∂θ < 0,∀i.
Proof. See the appendix.
Z−i
q˜T−i
q˜Ti
γ−i
β γ¯−i
Region 2 Region 3
q∗
q∗ + q˜∗
Case 1: θ > 0
q∗ + q˜∗
q∗
2q∗
Case 2: θ = 0
Region 2 Region 3
Z−i
q˜T−i
q˜Ti
γ−i
β γ¯−i
Figure 4: Effects of γ−i on the country i’s DM goods consumption (qTi ) with δαi = 1, β < γi
The negative effect of foreign inflation on a country’s exports is intuitive. A rising foreign
inflation lowers the real money balances held by foreign buyers and, consequently, reduces the
amount of special good that these agents can afford to purchase in the home DM . However, a
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higher foreign inflation does not affect the level of imports of the home country. The intuition is
as follows. A change in foreign inflation does not affect the demand for real home money bal-
ances. Hence, buyers from the home country carry exactly the same amount of home currency
into the FOREX market. Since the higher foreign inflation leads to an appreciation of the home
currency in the FOREX market, buyers from the home country end up entering the foreign DM
with more foreign currency. However, due to the competitive nature of the FOREX interdealer
market (and the consequent no-arbitrage condition in that market), this increase exactly offsets
the decrease in the value of foreign currency, which was caused by the initial rise in γ−i. As a
result, the amount of foreign DM good purchased by home buyers is unaffected by changes in
foreign inflation. Given this discussion, part (iii) of the proposition follows immediately. These
results are repeated in Figure 4.
The last part of Proposition 2 describes the effect of a change in the dealers’ bargaining
power on the volume of international trade. As θ increases, buyers from both countries antic-
ipate a less liquid FOREX market in the form of higher transaction fees. As we show in the
appendix, this induces buyers to carry a higher amount of real home money balances into the
FOREX market. However, the increase in the transaction fee overweighs the one in real money
balances, so that buyers leave the FOREX market with less real money available for purchases
in the foreign DM . Therefore, other things equal, an increase in θ decreases the level of imports
for both countries, and, hence, the total volume of international trade.
4.2.2 FOREX Market Liquidity
In this section, we examine the determinants of standard measures of FOREX market liquidity.
More specifically, we describe the trade volume in the FOREX market, both at the interdealer
and the buyer-dealer level, and the bid-ask spread, and we study how these variables are af-
fected by monetary policy and the FOREX market microstructure. The relevant results are
stated in Propositions 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
Proposition 3. The trade volume in the interdealer FOREX market, VID, is defined as the post-buyer-
dealer FOREX trade real moneyA (moneyB) balances held by country B (A). That is,
VID ≡ ϕAA¯BmA + ϕBA¯AmB .
We have the following results:
i) VID is decreasing in either country’s inflation rate, i.e., ∂VID/∂γi < 0, ∀i ∈ {A,B}.
ii) For given γi, γ−i, VID is decreasing in the dealer’s bargaining power, i.e., ∂VID/∂θ < 0.
iii) For given γi, γ−i, VID is increasing in the probability with which the typical buyer matches with a
dealer, i.e., ∂VID/∂(δαi) > 0, ∀i ∈ {A,B}.
Proof. See the appendix.
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To understand the definition of VID recall the dealer’s optimal portfolio decision discussed
in Lemma 7. In the stationary equilibrium, where γi > β, for all i, dealers never hold any of the
two currencies on their own account. In other words, dealers trade in the interdealer FOREX
market only with the currencies of the customers that they represent. Moreover, from the two
previous propositions we know that a rising inflation in country i leads to a fall in the real
value of buyer i’s post-FOREX portfolio. Hence, part (i) of Proposition 3 follows naturally. Part
(ii) of the proposition states that as θ increases, the amount of liquidity provided by dealers in
the typical buyer-dealer meeting decreases, and so does the volume of trade in the interdealer
market. This result follows closely from the properties of the buyer-dealer FOREX bargaining
protocol (i.e., Lemma 5) and is quite intuitive: when θ is high a large fraction of real balances
ends up directly in the dealers’ pockets in the form of fees. Thus, the amount of currencies that
get re-shuffled through the interdealer market decreases.
Part (iii) of the proposition is also intuitive.31 An increase in δαi leads to a greater number
of matches between dealers and buyers, which, in turn, raises the volume of interdealer market
trade because now a greater number of buyers is represented in that market (recall that dealers
trade in the interdealer market only with the currencies of customers that they represent). Also,
an increase in δαi has another less obvious effect: when this term is high buyers realize that
they are more likely to obtain a fruitful consumption opportunity abroad, which induces them
to carry more real home money balances (formally, ∂Zi/∂(δαi) > 0, ∀i). As a result, when δαi is
high, not only more buyers are represented in the interdealer market, but also each one of these
buyers wants to trade a larger amount of home currency, thus increasing VID even further.
Even though part (iii) of Proposition 3 describes the effect on VID of changes in δαi, rather
than δ, αi individually (see footnote 31), it should be noted that each one of these terms has
an important economic meaning on its own: αi captures the dealer availability in the FOREX
market, which is often interpreted as a measure of market liquidity in the finance literature.
Also, δ, the probability of obtaining a foreign consumption opportunity, can be viewed as the
degree of economic integration between the two countries.
Proposition 4. The trade volume in the buyer-dealer FOREX market, VBD, is defined as the sum of real
moneyA and moneyB balances collected by dealers during the round of bilateral trade. That is,
VBD ≡ ϕA
[
εam¯AB
(
δαAA
A
mA
)]
+ ϕB
[
m¯BA
(
δαBA
B
mB
)
εb
]
.
We have the following results:
i) VBD is decreasing in either country’s inflation rate, i.e., ∂VBD/∂γi < 0, ∀i ∈ {A,B}.
ii) For given γi, γ−i, VBD is increasing in the dealers’ bargaining power, i.e., ∂VBD/∂θ > 0.
31 The term VID is shown to be an implicit function only of the effective matching probability δαi, i.e., the
probability with which the buyer is a C-type and matches in the FOREX market. Hence, here we study the effect
on VID of changes in δαi, rather than δ, αi individually.
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iii) For given γi, γ−i, VBD is increasing in the probability with which the typical buyer of either country
matches with a FOREX dealer, i.e., ∂VBD/∂(δαi) > 0, ∀i ∈ {A,B}.
Proof. See the appendix.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 has a similar interpretation as part (i) of Proposition 3. A rising
inflation in country i depresses the equilibrium real balances held by the typical buyer i. More-
over, we know from Lemma 5 that the amount ofmoneyi that buyer i hands over to the dealer is
positively related to the amount that she brought into the FOREX market originally. Hence, the
negative relationship between VBD and γi follows immediately. While changes in either coun-
try’s inflation have the same effect on the volume of trade at both levels of the FOREX market,
this is not true for changes in the dealers’ bargaining position. When θ is large buyers carry a lot
of real balances (i.e., ∂Zi/∂θ > 0, ∀i) which, however, never make it to the interdealer market
simply because they end up in the dealers pockets in the form of fees. Hence, an increase in
θ reduces VID but it raises VBD. Part (iii) of Proposition 4 admits a similar interpretation as its
analogue in Proposition 3 (also, a comment similar to the one in footnote 31 applies here). An
increase in δαi raises the volume of trade at the buyer-dealer level both through the extensive
margin (more matches between buyers and dealers) and through the intensive margin (within
each match a larger amount of real balances changes hands, because the increase in δαi induces
buyers to carry more real balances).
Proposition 5. Recall the definition of εa, εb from Lemma 4, and define the spread in the buyer-dealer
FOREX market as the percentage difference between the ‘Ask’ and the ‘Bid’ price of moneyB and the
competitive interdealer price of currency, ε. That is,
SA ≡ ε
a − ε
ε
and SB ≡ ε− ε
b
εb
.
We have the following results:
i) S i is increasing in country i’s inflation rate, i.e., ∂S i/∂γi > 0, ∀i ∈ {A,B}.
ii) S i is increasing in the dealers’ bargaining power, i.e., ∂S i/∂θ > 0, ∀i ∈ {A,B}.
iii) S i is decreasing in the probability with which the typical buyer of either country matches with a
FOREX dealer, i.e., ∂S i/∂(δαi) < 0, ∀i ∈ {A,B}.
Proof. See the appendix.
From the earlier definition, it follows that S i is the per unit profit of a dealer who matched
with buyer i.32 Hence, an increase in S i can be viewed as a higher intermediation fee. Part (i)
32 For instance, consider a dealer who matched with buyer A who wants to acquire moneyB . The dealer visits
the interdealer market where she can purchase moneyB at price ε (in terms of moneyA), but she sells the acquired
money to the buyer at the negotiated price εa, where εa > ε.
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of the proposition states that an increase in country i’s inflation increases the equilibrium profit
of dealers that meet buyers from country i.33 This result is quite intuitive. Inflation in the home
currency decreases the amount of real balances held by buyers i, and makes them more liquidity
constrained. More precisely, a high γi implies that buyers can only purchase a small amount of
good in the foreignDM , and, since u is strictly concave, these buyers will have a high valuation
for an additional unit of foreign currency (which allows them to purchase a little more foreign
good). Simply put, a high γi makes buyers imore desperate for foreign currency and effectively
worsens their bargaining position. In turn, dealers take advantage of the buyers’ willingness to
purchase foreign currency at high prices and charge high intermediation fees.
As we have seen, an increase in the dealers’ bargaining power induces agents to carry a
larger amount of real home money balances into the FOREX market, which effectively improves
their bargaining position. However, while the typical buyer carries more real home money, a
disproportionately large fraction of this money is collected by the dealer, so that, ultimately,
the net effect on the spread is positive (part (ii) of the proposition). Finally, an increase in
the matching probability δαi decreases the dealers’ profits through the aforementioned real
balances channel: an increase in δαi induces buyers to carry more (real) local money into the
FOREX market, which effectively allows her to achieve more favorable terms of trade in the
negotiations with the dealer (part (iii) of the proposition).
Given that a high dealer availability (i.e., a high αi) is often interpreted as an index of high
market liquidity, part (iii) of Proposition 5 indicates that spreads will be tighter in a more liquid
market, a finding which is well-established both in the theoretical and the empirical finance
literature. However, it should be noted that the channel through which this result emerges in
our model is different than the one highlighted in the existing finance literature. For instance,
in DGP, a higher probability of contacting a dealer effectively improves the buyer’s (or, in the
DGP language, the investor’s) bargaining position by improving her search alternatives and,
hence, forcing the dealer to offer better prices. In our monetary model, a higher probability
of contacting a dealer effectively increases the agent’s bargaining power by making her less
liquidity constraint, and, thus, less eager to acquire foreign currency in the FOREX market.
4.2.3 Social Welfare and FOREX Market Microstructure
In this section, we study the effect of the FOREX market microstructure on social welfare. Fol-
lowing Rocheteau and Wright (2005), we define the social welfare function,W , as the sum (with
equal weights) of all agents’ steady state net utilities. Also, in what follows, for simplicity, we
focus on the case with symmetric dealer availability for both countries, i.e., αA = αB = α¯. As
33 Notice that a change in γ−i has no effect on Si. The reason is the same as the one discussed in part (ii) of
Proposition 2: an increase in γ−i allows buyers i to purchase more money−i in the FOREX market, but, at the same
time, the extra money−i that they acquire is not so valuable any more. Moreover, due to the competitive nature of
the interdealer market, these two opposing forces exactly offset one-another.
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we show in the appendix, the welfare function is given by
W = δα¯2{u(q˜TA)− q˜TA}+ δα¯2{u(q˜TB)− q˜TB} (19)
+ (1− δα¯){u(min{ZA, q∗})−min{ZA, q∗}}+ (1− δα¯){u(min{ZB, q∗})−min{ZB, q∗}} .
As is standard in models that build on LW, the welfare function depends only on net DM
utilities, i.e., the expressions u(q) − q, evaluated at q˜Ti or Zi (or q∗), which, are equilibrium
objects that have been described in detail in the previous propositions. To see why the CM
utilities of agents do not show up in W , notice that, in this model, with linear preferences in
the CM , agents work in that market only in order to acquire money. This has two implications.
First, agents who do not wish to hold money (i.e., sellers and dealers) never work in the CM .
Second, buyers work in order to purchase real balances which are later enjoyed (i.e., sold for
general good) either by a seller or a dealer.34 Hence, in the steady state, all the negative entries
in W (see eq.(a.32) in the appendix), which represent the buyers’ disutility from work, cancel
out with some positive entries, which represent the CM consumption of agents who sold the
money that they received from these buyers during the earlier rounds of trade.35
Proposition 6. i) For any γA, γB > β, we have ∂W/∂(α¯δ) > 0.
ii) If γi ≤ µ¯i, ∀i, then ∂W/∂θ < 0. On the other hand, if γi > µ¯i, ∀i, then the effect of changes in θ on
W differs depending on the value of δα¯. In particular, there exists a unique δ˜α ∈ (0, 1), such that
∂W
∂θ
> 0 iff δα¯ < δ˜α.
Proof. See the appendix.
Part (i) of the proposition is quite intuitive. An increase in the effective probability of match-
ing with a dealer improves welfare for two reasons. First, it implies that a greater number of
buyers is able to purchase the foreign DM good. This undoubtedly increases welfare, because
the buyers’ utility in the DM round is given by u(q) +u(q˜), with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and u′(0) =∞.36
Second, an increase in δα¯ raises equilibrium real home money balances. Hence, other things
equal, within any given match the buyer is able to purchase an amount of good which is closer
to the first best, q∗ (and which, clearly, maximizesW).
34 Or even by the buyers themselves, if they carry Zi > q∗, and they do not purchase any foreign DM good.
35 Given this discussion, the interpretation of eq.(19) is quite intuitive. The first (second) term on the RHS of
this equation represents the net surplus generated in DM meetings between sellers and matched C-type buyers
from country A (B). The relevant weight on this term, i.e., the measure of matched C-types from country A, δα¯,
is multiplied by 2 because these agents choose to consume the same amount of good (q˜TA) in both DMs. Similarly,
the third (fourth) term on the RHS of eq.(19) represents the net surplus generated in DM meetings between sellers
and buyers from country A (B) who only traded in their local DM .
36 Hence, a buyer can always increase her benefit by decreasing the local DM consumption q and increasing the
foreign DM consumption q˜. For more details, see the discussion following Lemma 4.
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The welfare effect of changes in θ, described in part (ii) of the proposition, is richer and
more interesting. Generally, an increase in θ lowers q˜Ti , ∀i (part (iv) of Proposition 2), which un-
doubtedly hurts welfare since it decreases the first two terms on the RHS of eq.(19). However,
we have also seen that an increase in θ raises Zi, ∀i, which could improve welfare since it may
increase the third and fourth terms on the RHS of eq.(19). While the first (negative) effect is
relevant for any level of inflation, the second (potentially positive) effect is relevant only when
buyers who trade exclusively at the home DM carry Zi < q∗, i.e., only if equilibrium lies in
Region 3. Hence, if γi ≤ µ¯i, ∀i, so that equilibrium lies in Region 2, an increase in θ only has a
negative effect on W by reducing the welfare generated in DM meetings between sellers and
matched C-type buyers (i.e., q˜Ti falls in the first two terms in eq.(19)). If, on the other hand,
γi > µ¯i, ∀i, so that equilibrium lies in Region 3, an increase in θ still causes the aforementioned
negative effect on W , but now it also creates a benefit by increasing the welfare generated in
DM meetings between sellers and buyers who only trade at home (i.e., Zi rises in the last two
terms in eq.(19)). Which of these forces prevails depends on the relative value of δα¯. If δα¯ is
relatively low, in the precise sense that δα¯ < δ˜α, the number of matches for which a high θ is
beneficial is large, and, hence an increase in the dealers’ bargaining power can improve welfare.
These results highlight that the FOREX market microstructure critically affects welfare.
Hence, our model delivers important insights which have been overlooked by the existing lit-
erature, where the FOREX market is typically modeled as a frictionless Walrasian market.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a two-country dynamic general equilibrium framework, where the
FOREX market is modeled in an empirically relevant way, namely, as a decentralized over-the-
counter (OTC) market characterized by bilateral trade and intermediation. Our paper can be
viewed as an attempt to bridge the gap between the two existing literatures on FOREX rate
determination: the traditional international macroeconomics approach and the recent FOREX
microstructure approach. Our model allows us to study questions that cannot be studied within
either of the two existing literatures in isolation. For instance, we are able to explicitly compute
standard measures of FOREX market liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads and trade volume, and
to analyze how these measures are affected both by monetary policy and the FOREX market
microstructure. Among other results, we find that: a) an increase in either country’s inflation
raises the bid-ask spreads; b) an increase in either country’s inflation decreases the total trade
volume in the FOREX market; and c) an increase in the FOREX dealer’s bargaining power raises
the investor-dealer trade volume, but lowers the interdealer trade volume.
Our theory also sheds new light on how the FOREX market microstructure can affect inter-
national trade and welfare. We find that an increase in the FOREX market liquidity (measured
by dealer availability) will undoubtedly increase international trade and welfare, but an in-
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crease in the dealers’ bargaining power could increase or decrease welfare depending on the
FOREX market liquidity and the degree of economic integration between the two countries.
These results highlight that modeling the FOREX market as a frictionless Walrasian market
is not without loss of generality, and our model makes a first step towards incorporating the
institutional details of the FOREX market within a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.
Plugging eq.(2) into (3) yields
W˜D(m
d) = max
{m˜dA,m˜dB}
{
ϕAm˜
d
A + ϕBm˜
d
B + µ
(
mdA + εm
d
B − m˜dA − εm˜dB
)
+ λAm˜
d
A + λBm˜
d
B
}
+WD(0),
where µ represents the Lagrangian multiplier on the feasibility constraint, and λA, λB denote
the multipliers on the nonnegativity constraints m˜dA, m˜
d
B ∈ R+, respectively. The FOCs for are
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given by
ϕA − µ+ λA = 0, (a.1)
ϕB − µε+ λB = 0, (a.2)
µ
(
mdA + εm
d
B − m˜dA − εm˜dB
)
= 0. (a.3)
Combining eq.(a.1) and (a.2), one can verify that µ > 0 and εϕA + ελA = ϕB + λB. Then,
three are the possible scenarios: (1): λA > 0 = λB, (2): λA = λB = 0, and (3): λA = 0 < λB.
In case (1), eq.(a.3) imply m˜dA = 0, m˜
d
B = m
d
B + m
d
A/ε, and εϕA < ϕB. In case (2), the FOCs
imply m˜dA ∈ [0,mdA + εmdB], m˜dB = mdB + (mdB − m˜dA)/ε, and εϕA = ϕB. In case (3), eq.(a.3)
implies m˜dA = m
d
A + εm
d
B, m˜
d
B = 0, and εϕA > ϕB. Eq.(10) can be derived by plugging the
post-interdealer FOREX portfolio
(
m˜dA, m˜
d
B
)
into eq.(3). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Two possible pairs can be formed: (i): a meeting between a buyerA and a dealer, (ii): a meeting
between a buyerB and a dealer. We only show the solution for the former in detail (the solution
for the latter follows identical steps).
Proof of part (a):
In the bargaining game between a buyer A and a dealer, the Lagrangian function becomes
L = ϕ¯ [m¯dA + εm¯dB − (mdA + εmdB)]
+ λ1
{
θ
1− θ
[
u
(
qA
(
m¯AA
))
+ u
(
q˜A
(
m¯AB
))− u (qA (mAA))+ ϕA [pA(mAA)− pA(m¯AA)− (mAA − m¯AA)]]}
− λ1
{
ϕ¯
[
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B − (mdA + εmdB)
]}
+ λ2
{
mdA +m
A
A + εm
d
B −
(
m¯dA + m¯
A
A + ε[m¯
d
B + m¯
A
B]
)}
+ λ3m¯
d
A + λ4m¯
d
B + λ5m¯
A
A + λ6m¯
A
B,
where λ1 denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the Kalai constraint, and λ2 denotes the La-
grangian multiplier on the feasibility constraint. The terms λ3 to λ6 represent the multipliers on
the nonnegativity constraints. The corresponding FOCs are given by
ϕ¯− λ1ϕ¯− λ2 + λ3 = 0, (a.4)
λ1
θ
1− θ
{
u′
(
q(m¯AA)
) ∂q
∂mA
∣∣∣∣
mA=m¯
A
A
− ϕA
(
∂p
∂mA
∣∣∣∣
mA=m¯
A
A
− 1
)}
− λ2 + λ5 = 0, (a.5)
ϕ¯ε− λ1ϕ¯ε− λ2ε+ λ4 = 0, (a.6)
λ1
θ
1− θu
′ (q˜(m¯AB)) ∂q˜∂mB
∣∣∣∣
mB=m¯
A
B
− λ2ε+ λ6 = 0. (a.7)
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Suppose λ2 = 0 then, from eq.(a.7) and Lemma 2 the following holds:
λ1
θ
1− θu
′ (ϕBm¯AB)ϕB︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+λ6 = 0.
For the equation above to hold, it must be the case that λ1 = λ6 = 0. Then, from eq.(a.6), we
have ϕ¯ε+λ4 = 0, which is a contradiction. Thus, λ2 > 0 always. Since λ1 > 0 as well, six possible
cases remain: (1) λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = 0 < λ6, (2) λ3 = λ4 = λ6 = 0 < λ5, (3) λ4 = λ5 = λ6 = 0 < λ3,
(4) λ3 = λ5 = λ6 = 0 < λ4, (5) λ5 = λ6 = 0 and λ3 > 0 and λ4 > 0, (6) λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = λ6 = 0.37
Moreover, λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 imply
ϕ¯
[
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B − (mdA + εmdB)
]
= (a.8)
θ
1− θ
[
u
(
qA
(
m¯AA
))
+ u
(
q˜A
(
m¯AB
))− u (qA (mAA))+ ϕA [pA(mAA)− pA(m¯AA)− (mAA − m¯AA)]] ,
mdA +m
A
A + εm
d
B = m¯
d
A + m¯
A
A + ε[m¯
d
B + m¯
A
B]. (a.9)
We analyze each case one by one.
Case 1: λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = 0 < λ6⇒ m¯AB = 0.
From eq.(a.4) and (a.6), we get λ2 = ϕ¯(1− λ1). Then eq.(a.5) implies that
λ1
θ
1− θ
{
u′
(
q(m¯AA)
) ∂q
∂mA
∣∣∣∣
mA=m¯
A
A
− ϕA
(
∂p
∂mA
∣∣∣∣
mA=m¯
A
A
− 1
)}
= ϕ¯(1− λ1).
Suppose m¯AA ≥ m∗A, then
λ1
θ
1− θϕA = ϕ¯(1− λ1),
⇒ λ1
[
θ
1− θ +
ϕ¯
ϕA
]
=
ϕ¯
ϕA
,
⇒ λ1 = ϕ¯/ϕA
(ϕ¯/ϕA) + (θ/(1− θ)) < 1.
But from eq.(a.7), we have u′ (0) =∞, which is a contradiction. Suppose m¯AA < m∗A. Then, from
eq.(a.5) we obtain
λ1 =
ϕ¯/(ϕAu
′(ϕ¯m¯AA))
ϕ¯/(ϕAu′(ϕ¯m¯AA)) + (θ/(1− θ))
< 1.
But again, from eq.(a.7), we have u′ (0) = ∞, which is a contradiction. Thus, case (1) cannot be
37 Technically speaking, there are other possible cases to consider. In what follows, however, we explain why
those cases are ruled out.
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a solution.
Case 2: λ3 = λ4 = λ6 = 0 < λ5⇒ m¯AB > 0 and m¯AA = 0.
Again, the RHS of eq.(a.5) goes to infinity as u′(q(0)) = ∞. This restricts our attention to λ5 =
λ6 = 0 (i.e., m¯AA > 0 and m¯
A
B > 0) for the rest of the cases considered.
Case 3: λ5 = λ6 = λ4 = 0 < λ3⇒ m¯dA = 0 and m¯dB > 0.
From eq.(a.6), we have λ2 = ϕ¯(1− λ1), but from eq.(a.4) we get
ϕ¯(1− λ1) + λ3︸︷︷︸
>0
= λ2,
which is a contradiction. This implies that case (3) cannot be a solution to the problem.
Case 4: λ5 = λ6 = λ3 = 0 < λ4⇒ m¯dA > 0 and m¯dB = 0.
From eq.(a.4), we have λ2 = ϕ¯(1− λ1). Also, eq.(a.6) becomes
ϕ¯(1− λ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ2
+ (λ4/ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= λ2.
This is also a contradiction.
Case 5: λ5 = λ6 = 0 and λ3 > 0 & λ4 > 0⇒ m¯dA = 0 and m¯dB = 0.
In this case, the dealer’s surplus becomes non-positive (i.e., ϕ¯[m¯dA + εm¯
d
B − (mdA + εmdB)] ≤ 0).
Thus, this case cannot be the solution either.
Case 6: λ3 = λ4 = λ4 = λ5 = λ6 = 0⇒ m¯dA > 0 and m¯dB > 0.
From equations (a.4) and (a.6), we obtain λ2 = ϕ¯(1− λ1). Now, suppose m¯AA ≥ m∗A. Then, from
eq.(a.5), λ1(θ/(1− θ))ϕA = λ2. Combine this with λ2 = ϕ¯(1− λ1) to obtain
λ1 =
ϕ¯
ϕ¯+ ϕAθ/(1− θ) < 1,
λ2 = ϕ¯
ϕAθ/(1− θ)
ϕ¯+ ϕAθ/(1− θ) .
From eq.(a.7), λ1θ/(1 − θ)u′(ϕBm¯AB)ϕB = λ2ε. Replacing λ1 and λ2 from above, one can derive
the following:
u′(ϕBm¯AB) =
ϕAε
ϕB
. (a.10)
Therefore, the solution for m¯AB must satisfy eq.(a.10) which corresponds to the χ
∗
B in eq.(11).
Next, we solve for the m¯AA. First, eq.(a.8) can be re-written as
ϕ¯
[
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B − (mdA + εmdB)
]
=
θ
1− θ
{
u(q∗) + u(ϕBm¯AB)− u(q∗) + ϕA
[
m¯AA −mAA
]}
.
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After rearranging, the following equation can be derived:
m¯AA = m
A
A −
u(ϕBm¯
A
B)
ϕA
+
1− θ
θ
ϕ¯
ϕA
[
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B − (mdA + εmdB)
]
.
Lastly, using mdB − m¯dB = χ∗B and m¯dA −mdA = mAA − m¯AA, m¯AA is given by
m¯AA = m
A
A −
θu(ϕBχ
∗
B) + ϕ¯(1− θ)εχ∗B
ϕAθ + ϕ¯(1− θ) , (a.11)
which is the solution provided in the lemma. Eq.(a.11) implies a couple of important things
regarding the bargaining solution. First, it corresponds to τA(χ∗B) in eq.(13). Second, the as-
sumption that m¯AA ≥ m∗A implies mAA ≥ m∗A+ τA(χ∗B), which, in turn, verifies the first cutoff level
for mAA in Lemma 4.
Now, let us consider the alternative case where m¯AA ≤ m∗A. Then, from eq.(a.5), we have
λ1θ/(1− θ)ϕAu′(ϕm¯AA) = λ2. Combine this with λ2 = ϕ¯(1− λ1) to get
λ1 =
ϕ¯
ϕ¯+ ϕAu′(ϕm¯AA)θ/(1− θ)
< 1,
λ2 = ϕ¯
ϕAu
′(ϕm¯AA)θ/(1− θ)
ϕ¯+ ϕAu′(ϕm¯AA)θ/(1− θ)
.
From eq.(a.7), we have λ1θ/(1− θ)u′(ϕBm¯AB)ϕB = λ2ε. Replacing λ1 and λ2 from above, one can
derive the following necessary condition:
ϕBu
′(ϕBm¯AB)
ϕAu′(ϕAm¯AA)
=
ϕ¯ε
ϕ¯
, (a.12)
where the LHS captures the MRS between the special good B and A for the buyer A, while the
RHS represents the MRS of the dealer. Like before, we need to rearrange the Kalai constraint
eq.(a.8). Here, we consider two different subcases.
Subcase 1: m∗A ≤ mAA.
Using Lemma 1, and after some algebra, eq.(a.8) can be rearranged to
mAA =m¯
A
A +
θu(ϕBm¯
A
B) + (1− θ)ϕ¯εm¯AB
θϕA + (1− θ)ϕ¯ −
θ (u(q∗)− q∗)− θ (u(ϕAm¯AA)− ϕAm¯AA)
θϕA + (1− θ)ϕ¯ (a.13)
=m¯AA + τA(m¯
A
B)− ξ(m¯AA) = Γ(m¯AB),
where ξ(m¯AA) is a simpler notation for {θ (u(q∗)− q∗)− θ
(
u(ϕAm¯
A
A)− ϕAm¯AA
)}/{θϕA + (1− θ)ϕ¯},
and Γ(·) is defined in Lemma 4. As a result, (m¯AA, m¯AB) must solve the system of equations
(a.12),(a.13). Furthermore, since m¯AA ≤ m∗A, max{τA(m¯AB)} = τA(χ∗B), and min{ξ(m¯AA)} = 0, we
must have mAA ≤ m∗A + τA(χ∗B), which verifies the second cutoff level for mAA in Lemma 4.
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The existence and uniqueness of (m¯AA, m¯
A
B) can be proven in the following way. First, given
the form of eq.(a.12), it suffices to show the existence and uniqueness of m¯AB only. Let G(m¯
A
B)
represent m¯AA such that eq.(a.12) holds. Then, if we define the function
H(m¯AB) ≡ G(m¯AB)−mAA +
θu(ϕBm¯
A
B) + (1− θ)ϕ¯εm¯AB − θ (u(q∗)− q∗) + θ
(
u(ϕAG(m¯
A
B))− ϕAG(m¯AB)
)
θϕA + (1− θ)ϕ¯ ,
(a.14)
a solution (to our existence problem) will be a m¯AB that solves H(m¯
A
B) = 0. It is easy to see that
H(0) < 0. Also, H ′(·) > 0 in the whole domain, sinceG′ > 0 from eq.(a.12), and u′(·) > 0. Lastly,
max{m¯AB} = χ∗B from eq.(a.12). This leads to
H(χ∗B) = m
∗
A + τA(χ
∗
B)−mAA ≥ 0.
This proves the existence and uniqueness of (m¯AA, m¯
A
B) when m
∗
A ≤ mAA ≤ m∗A + τA(χ∗).
Subcase 2: mAA ≤ m∗A.
Using Lemma 1, after some eq.(a.8) can be rearranged as follows:
mAA =m¯
A
A +
θu(ϕBm¯
A
B) + (1− θ)ϕ¯εm¯AB
(1− θ)ϕ¯ −
θ
(
u(ϕAm
A
A)− u(ϕAm¯AA)
)
(1− θ)ϕ¯ = Λ(m¯
A
B), (a.15)
where Λ(·) is defined in Lemma 4. Similar to subcase 1, (m¯AA, m¯AB) must solve the system of
equations (a.12), (a.15). Define the function
R(m¯AB) ≡ G(m¯AB)−mAA +
θu(ϕBm¯
A
B) + (1− θ)ϕ¯εm¯AB + θ
(
u(ϕAG(m¯
A
B))− u(ϕAmAA)
)
(1− θ)ϕ¯ . (a.16)
It can be easily verified that R(0) < 0 and R′(m¯AB) > 0, since G
′ > 0 and u′ > 0. Also, m¯AB never
exceeds χ∗B from eq.(a.12), and therefore R(χ
∗
B) can be re-written as
R(χ∗B) = m
∗
A −mAA + εχ∗B +
θ
(
u(ϕBm¯
A
B) + u(ϕAG(m¯
A
B))− u(ϕAmAA)
)
(1− θ)ϕ¯ ,
where u(ϕBm¯AB) + u(ϕAG(m¯
A
B)) − u(ϕAmAA) corresponds to buyer A’s surplus which is non-
negative. Since mAA ≤ m∗A, we also have R(χ∗B) > 0. This completes the proof for the existence
and uniqueness.
Proof of parts (b) and (c):
When mAA ≥ m∗A+τA(χ∗B), the term εa is defined as εam¯AB = mAA−m¯AA. Combining this definition
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with eq.(a.11) and rearranging yields38
εa = ε+
θ {u(ϕBχ∗B)− ϕAεχ∗B}
{ϕAθ + ϕ¯(1− θ)}χ∗B
. (a.17)
Combining equations (a.9),(a.11), and the fact that m¯AB = χ
∗
B, we obtain
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B =m
d
A + εm
d
B + τA(χ
∗
B) = m
d
A + εm
d
B + (ε
a − ε)χ∗B,
where the second equality follows from eq.(a.17). This result verifies Corollary 1 in the case
where mAA ≥ m∗A + τA(χ∗B). Then, the terms m¯dA and m¯dB in part (c) of the lemma follow immedi-
ately. When m∗A ≤ mAA ≤ m∗A + τA(χ∗), one can obtain39
εa = ε+
θ
{
u(ϕBm¯
A
B)− ϕAεm¯AB
}− θ {u(q∗)− q∗}+ θ {u(ϕAG(m¯AB))− ϕAG(m¯AB)}
{ϕAθ + ϕ¯(1− θ)} m¯AB
, (a.18)
by combining the definition of εa with eq.(a.13) with some algebra. Using equations (a.18), (a.9),
and (a.13), the following holds true
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B =m
d
A + εm
d
B + (ε
a − ε)m¯AB.
This result again verifies Corollary 1 in the case of m∗A ≤ mAA ≤ m∗A + τA(χ∗). Then, immediate
access to the interdealer market after bargaining makes it straightforward to solve for the terms
m¯dA and m¯
d
B that appear in part (c) of the lemma. When m
A
A ≤ m∗A, The term εa can be derived
as in subcase 1:40
εa = ε+
θ
{
u(ϕBm¯
A
B) + u(ϕAm¯
A
A)− u(ϕAmAA)
}
(1− θ)ϕ¯m¯AB
. (a.19)
38 Note that the second pair counter part, namely εb, can be derived using similar steps:
1/εb = 1/ε+
θ {u(ϕAχ∗A)− (ϕB/ε)χ∗A}
{ϕBθ + ϕ¯ε(1− θ)}χ∗A
.
39 Note that εb can be derived following similar steps:
1/εb = (1/ε) +
θ
{
u(ϕAm¯
B
A)− (ϕB/ε)m¯BA
}− θ {u(q∗)− q∗}+ θ {u(ϕBG(m¯BA))− ϕBG(m¯BA)}
{ϕBθ + ϕ¯ε(1− θ)} m¯BA
.
40 Again, the term εb takes the form
1/εb = (1/ε) +
θ
{
u(ϕAm¯
B
A) + u(ϕBm¯
B
B)− u(ϕBmBB)
}
(1− θ)ϕ¯εm¯BA
.
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Using equations (a.19), (a.9), and (a.15), one can show that
m¯dA + εm¯
d
B =m
d
A + εm
d
B + (ε
a − ε)m¯AB,
which verifies Corollary 1 in the case of mAA ≤ m∗A. To derive the terms m¯dA and m¯dB in part (c) of
the lemma one simply has to follow the same steps as in subcase 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5.
Again, we focus on the case where a dealer meets a buyer A.
Region 1: mAA ≥ m∗A + τA(χ∗B).
From eq.(a.17) it can be easily verified that ∂εa/∂θ = 0 and ∂m¯AB/∂m
A
A = ∂m¯
A
B/∂θ = 0. Moreover,
eq.(a.11) confirms that ∂(mAA − m¯AA)/∂mAA = 0. From eq.(a.17) it suffices to show that u(ϕBχ∗B) >
ϕAεχ
∗
B in order to prove that ∂ε
a/∂θ > 0. The proof of this claim is straightforward. We have
u(ϕBχ
∗
B)
ϕAεχ∗B
> 1 ⇒ u(ϕBχ
∗
B)
ϕBχ∗B
>
ϕAε
ϕB
,
where the second inequality follows from the concavity of u. This inequality also confirms that
εa > ε (following from eq.(a.17)), which, in turn, proves that ∂(mAA − m¯AA)/∂θ > 0.
Region 2: m∗A ≤ mAA ≤ m∗A + τA(χ∗B).
From eq.(a.8), the surplus for the buyer A must be positive. Along with the fact that q∗ > ϕAm¯AA
in this region, the following must be true:
u(ϕBm¯
A
B) ≥ϕA(mAA − m¯AA) + u(q∗)− q∗ − (u(ϕAm¯AA)− ϕAm¯AA), (a.20)
u(ϕBm¯
A
B) >ϕAεm¯
A
B + u(q
∗)− q∗ − (u(ϕAm¯AA)− ϕAm¯AA),
where the second inequality follows from the fact that (mAA − m¯AA) = εam¯AB > εm¯AB. Notice that
εa > ε follows from eq.(a.18) and the fact that buyer surplus (i.e., the numerator in the second
part of eq.(a.18)) is positive.
In what follows, let Q(m¯AB) ≡ u(ϕBm¯AB)−ϕAεm¯AB−u(q∗) + q∗+ (u(ϕAm¯AA)−ϕAm¯AA). First, we
prove that ∂m¯AB/∂θ < 0. Using the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) on eq.(a.14), we know that
∂m¯AB
∂θ
= − ∂H/∂θ
∂H/∂m¯AB
< 0,
because
∂H
∂m¯AB
= G′(m¯AB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ε+ θ
{
ϕBu
′(ϕBm¯AB)− ϕAε)
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0. (a.21)
That the second highlighted term in the expression above is positive follows directly from
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eq.(a.12). Moreover,
∂H
∂θ
=
Q(m¯AB) (ϕAθ + (1− θ)ϕ¯)− θ(ϕA − ϕ¯)Q(m¯AB)
(ϕAθ + (1− θ)ϕ¯)2
> 0.
This inequality follows from that the fact that Q(m¯AB) > 0 (see (a.20)).
Given the analysis so far, the claims that ∂εa/∂θ > 0, ∂m¯AB/∂m
A
A > 0, ∂ε
am¯AB/∂m
A
A > 0, and
∂εam¯AB/∂θ > 0 can all be verified by combining ∂m¯
A
B/∂θ < 0 and eq.(a.13).
That ∂εa/∂mAA < 0 can be shown as follows: Substitute Q(m¯
A
B) into eq.(a.18), to obtain ε
a =
ε+
{
θQ(m¯AB)
}
/
{
ϕAθ + ϕ¯(1− θ)m¯AB
}
. Then, consider any two arbitrary values of m¯AB, say x and
y, where x < y. Since ∂m¯AB/∂m
A
A > 0, it suffices to show that ε + {θQ(x)} /{ϕAθ + ϕ¯(1− θ)x} >
ε+{θQ(y)} /{ϕAθ + ϕ¯(1− θ)y}. The concavity ofQ(·) implies thatQ(x)/x > Q(y)/y, and, hence,
the proof is complete.
Region 3: mAA ≤ m∗A
As in Region 2, eq.(a.19) and the fact that the buyer’s surplus is positive confirm that ∂εa/∂θ > 0
and εa > ε. We now prove that ∂m¯AB/∂θ < 0. Exploiting the IFT on eq.(a.16), we obtain
∂m¯AB
∂θ
= − ∂R/∂θ
∂R/∂m¯AB
< 0,
where it is straightforward to see that ∂R/∂m¯AB > 0. Moreover,
∂R
∂θ
=
(
u(ϕBm¯
A
B) + u(ϕAm¯
A
A)− u(ϕAmAA)
) {(1− θ)ϕ¯+ θϕ¯}
((1− θ)ϕ¯)2 > 0,
which follows from that the fact that the buyer’s surplus, u(ϕBm¯AB) + u(ϕAm¯
A
A) − u(ϕAmAA), is
positive. Then, the claims that ∂εa/∂θ > 0, ∂m¯AB/∂m
A
A > 0, ∂ε
am¯AB/∂m
A
A > 0, and ∂ε
am¯AB/∂θ >
0 can all be verified from combining ∂m¯AB/∂θ < 0 and eq.(a.15). The proof of the fact that
∂εa/∂mAA < 0 is similar to the one in Region 2 above.Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8.
We have the following cases: Case 1: ϕi/βϕ̂i = 1 rules out Regions 2 and 3. To see this point,
note from eq.(16) and (17), that for any value of m̂i in these regions, J ir is greater than zero.
Then, only m̂i = m∗i + τi
(
χ∗−i
)
guarantees that eq.(15) is satisfied.
Case 2: Suppose 1 < ϕi/βϕ̂i and the optimal m̂i < m∗i + τi(χ∗−i) (i.e., m¯i < m∗i ). Then, the FOC
must correspond to eq.(16), which can be rewritten as
ϕi
βϕ̂i
= 1 + δαi
ϕ̂−i
ϕ̂i
u′(ϕ̂−im¯i−i)
∂m¯i−i
∂m̂ii
+ δαi
{
u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
∂m¯ii
∂m̂ii
− 1
}
.
45
Using eq.(12) we can simplify this expression further and write
ϕi
βϕ̂i
= 1 + δαi[ε̂I{i=A} + (1/ε̂)I{i=B}]u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
∂m¯i−i
∂m̂ii
+ δαi
{
u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
∂m¯ii
∂m̂ii
− 1
}
.
Next, solve for ∂m¯ii/∂mii and ∂m¯i−i/∂mii, employing the IFT on eq.(a.14). We have
∂m¯ii
∂mii
=− −1
(θϕi + (1− θ)ϕ¯[·] + θ {ϕiu′(ϕim¯ii)− ϕi}) / (θϕi + (1− θ)ϕ¯[·])
=
θϕi + (1− θ)ϕ¯[·]
θϕiu′(ϕim¯ii) + (1− θ)ϕ¯[·]
, (a.22)
and
∂m¯i−i
∂mii
=− −1(
θϕ−i + (1− θ)ϕ¯[¯·] + θ
{
ϕ−iu′(ϕ−im¯i−i)− ϕ−i
})
/ (θϕi + (1− θ)ϕ¯[·])
=
θϕi + (1− θ)ϕ¯[·]
θϕ−iu′(ϕ−im¯i−i) + (1− θ)ϕ¯[¯·]
, (a.23)
where [¯·] = εI{i=A}+I{i=B} and [·] = εI{i=B}+I{i=A}. Then, plug eq.(a.22) and (a.23) into eq.(a.22)
to obtain
ϕi
βϕ̂i
=1 + δαi[ε̂I{i=A} + (1/ε̂)I{i=B}]u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
θϕ̂i + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θϕ̂−iu′(ϕ̂−im¯i−i) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[¯·]
+ δαi
{
u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
θϕ̂i + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θϕ̂iu′(ϕ̂im¯ii) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·] − 1
}
.
Exploiting eq.(12) once again leads to the following Euler equation:
ϕi
βϕ̂i
=1 + δαixu
′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
θϕ̂i + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θxϕ̂iu′(ϕ̂im¯ii) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[¯·] (a.24)
+ δαi
{
u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
θϕ̂i + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θϕ̂iu′(ϕ̂im¯ii) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·] − 1
}
,
where x = [ε̂I{i=A} + (1/ε̂)I{i=B}] and m¯ii is a function of m̂i taking prices as given. The RHS of
eq.(a.24) is strictly decreasing in m¯ii due to the concavity of u. This, combined with Lemma 4,
confirms the uniqueness of the optimal m̂i in Region 2. Furthermore, it can be easily observed
that the optimal m̂i is independent of the money−i holding cost, ϕ−i/(βϕ̂−i).
Lastly, since so far we have assumed m¯i < m∗i , ϕi/βϕ̂i must be bounded from above by µ¯
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which solves
µ¯ =1 + δαixu
′(ϕ̂im∗i )
θϕ̂i + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θxϕ̂iu′(ϕ̂im∗i ) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[¯·]
+ δαi
{
u′(ϕ̂im∗i )
θϕ̂i + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θϕ̂iu′(ϕ̂im∗i ) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·] − 1
}
> 1.
Case 3: Suppose µ¯ ≤ ϕi/βϕ̂i. The FOC corresponds to eq.(17), which can be re-written as
ϕi
βϕ̂i
= 1 + δαi
ϕ̂−i
ϕ̂i
u′(ϕ̂−im¯i−i)
∂m¯i−i
∂m̂ii
+ δαi
{
u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
∂m¯ii
∂m̂ii
− 1
}
+ (1− δαi) {u′(ϕ̂im̂i)− 1} .
Using eq.(12), we can simplify this to
ϕi
βϕ̂i
=1 + δαi[ε̂I{i=A} + (1/ε̂)I{i=B}]u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
∂m¯i−i
∂m̂ii
(a.25)
+ δαi
{
u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
∂m¯ii
∂m̂ii
− 1
}
+ (1− δαi) {u′(ϕ̂im̂i)− 1} .
Next, solve for ∂m¯ii/∂mii and ∂m¯i−i/∂mii employing the IFT into eq.(a.16). We have
∂m¯ii
∂mii
=
θϕiu
′(ϕimii) + (1− θ)ϕ¯[·]
θϕiu′(ϕim¯ii) + (1− θ)ϕ¯[·]
, (a.26)
and
∂m¯i−i
∂mii
=
θϕiu
′(ϕAmii) + (1− θ)ϕ¯[·]
θϕ−iu′(ϕ−im¯i−i) + (1− θ)ϕ¯[¯·]
, (a.27)
where [¯·] = εI{i=A}+ I{i=B} and [·] = εI{i=B}+ I{i=A}. Substitute eq.(a.26) and (a.27) into eq.(a.25)
to obtain
ϕi
βϕ̂i
=1 + δαi[ε̂I{i=A} + (1/ε̂)I{i=B}]u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
θϕ̂iu
′(ϕ̂im̂ii) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θϕ̂−iu′(ϕ̂−im¯i−i) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[¯·]
+ δαi
{
u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
θϕ̂iu
′(ϕ̂im̂ii) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θϕ̂iu′(ϕ̂im¯ii) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·] − 1
}
.
Exploiting eq.(12) one more time finally leads to the following Euler equation:
ϕi
βϕ̂i
=1 + δαixu
′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
θϕ̂iu
′(ϕ̂im̂i) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θxϕ̂iu′(ϕ̂im¯ii) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[¯·] (a.28)
+ δαi
{
u′(ϕ̂im¯ii)
θϕ̂iu
′(ϕ̂im̂i) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·]
θϕ̂iu′(ϕ̂im¯ii) + (1− θ)̂¯ϕ[·] − 1
}
,
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where x = [ε̂I{i=A} + (1/ε̂)I{i=B}] and m¯ii is a function of m̂i taking prices as given. As in the
previous case, the RHS of eq.(a.28) is strictly decreasing in m̂i. This completes the proof of
uniqueness. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We have shown that ϕ̂im̂i is strictly decreasing in ϕi/(βϕ̂i). In an equilibrium with γi > β,
Lemma 7 implies that Admi = 0. Using m̂i = A
i
mi
in equilibrium, one can calculate the real
balances Zi = ϕiAimi = ϕ̂iÂ
i
mi
, and verify they are strictly decreasing in γi. When γi = β
(i.e., at the Friedman Rule), then m̂ = m∗i + τi(χ∗−i) from Lemma 8, which leads to Zi = q∗ +
[θu(q∗) + (1− θ)q∗] in equilibrium. From Lemmas 1, 2 buyers from a country i get the first best
in this case. Note that Zi = qTi only if θ = 0. The difference between these two terms when θ > 0
represents the transaction fees that dealers extract in terms of real moneyi balances. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
From eq.(12) and the fact that ϕB = εϕA in equilibrium, q˜Ti equals to country i’s total consump-
tion of local special good. This explains the fact that qT−i = 2q˜T−i. Next, in the proof of Proposition
1 we showed that the amount of real home money balances are decreasing in a country’s infla-
tion rate. Thus, qT−i is decreasing in γ−i. Also, since qT−i = 2q˜T−i, we have ∂q˜T−i/∂γ−i < 0.
In the proof of Lemma 8 earlier, we showed that the demand for moneyi is not affected by
ϕ−i/βϕ̂−i, which equals to γ−i in equilibrium. This suffices to show that ∂q˜Ti /∂γ−i = 0. Lastly,
θ > 0 guarantees a positive transaction fee earned by dealers and therefore Z−i > 2q˜T−i, ∀γ−i
when θ > 0.
For part (iv), it suffices to show that FOCs of buyer i imply ∂(ϕ−im¯i−i)/∂θ < 0 at equilib-
rium. By applying the equilibrium conditions, u′(ϕˆ−im¯i−i (m̂i, ε,ϕ)) = u′(ϕˆim¯ii (m̂i, ε,ϕ)), and
ϕ̂Aε̂ = ϕ̂B into eq.(a.24) and (a.28), one can get the following two FOCs for Regions 2 and 3
respectively:
ϕi
βϕ̂i
= (1− δαi) + 2δαiu
′(ϕ̂im¯ii (m̂i, ε,ϕ)))
θu′(ϕ̂im¯ii (m̂i, ε,ϕ))) + (1− θ)
,
ϕi
βϕ̂i
= (1− δαi) + 2δαiu
′(ϕ̂im¯ii (m̂i, ε,ϕ))) {θu′(ϕ̂im̂i) + (1− θ)}
θu′(ϕ̂im¯ii (m̂i, ε,ϕ))) + (1− θ)
.
Given prices and the fact that u′(ϕ̂im¯ii (m̂i, ε,ϕ))) > 1 for all equilibrium regions, and given that
u′(ϕ̂im¯ii (m̂i, ε,ϕ))) > u
′(ϕ̂im̂i) > 1 in Region 3, it is straightforward to see that ∂(ϕim¯ii)/∂θ =
∂(ϕ−im¯i−i)/∂θ < 0 for both regions. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
In the proof of Proposition 1, it was shown that ϕ̂im̂i is strictly decreasing in γi. Thus, on ag-
gregate, the equilibrium ϕiA¯imi must also be decreasing in γi. Moreover, since eq.(12) indicates
a positive correlation between ϕ̂im¯ii and ϕ̂−im¯i−i, ϕ−iA¯im−i in equilibrium must be decreasing
in γi. Given the definition of VID, it follows that ∂VID/∂γi < 0, ∀i ∈ {A,B}. Part (ii) of the
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proposition follows from part (iv) of Proposition 2. The proof for part (iii) follows from the the
Euler equations for buyer i, i.e., eq.(a.24) and (a.28). A higher δαi increases the expected benefit
from carrying real local money balances, which, in turn, leads to a greater ϕ̂im¯ii (m̂i, ε,ϕ) and a
greater ϕ̂−im¯i−i (m̂i, ε,ϕ) in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Lemma 5 confirms that mii − m¯ii is increasing in the units of moneyi that buyer i brings to the
match. Since in equilibrium γi depresses Zi, the total volume of real moneyi balance transfer to
dealers is negatively correlated to γi. This proves part (i). Part (ii) of the proposition follows
from the fact that Zi is increasing is increasing in θ. The proof of part (iii) of Proposition 4
follows identical steps as the one of part (ii) of Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.
We focus on the case i = A (the proof for i = B follows identical steps). First, we impose the
equilibrium condition for the interdealer exchange rate, εϕB = ϕA. Then, in Region 1, eq.(a.17)
can be rearranged as to
(εa − ε)/ε = θ {u(q
∗)− q∗}
q∗
. (a.29)
The term (εa− ε)/ε for Regions 2 and 3 is then implied by eq.(a.18) and (a.19), respectively, and
it is given as follows:
(εa − ε)/ε = θ
{
u(ϕBm¯
A
B)− ϕBm¯AB +
[
u(ϕAG(m¯
A
B))− ϕAG(m¯AB))
]− (u(q∗)− q∗)}
ϕBm¯AB
, (a.30)
(εa − ε)/ε = θ
{
u(ϕBm¯
A
B) + u(ϕAG(m¯
A
B))− u(ZA)
}
ϕBm¯AB
, (a.31)
where m¯AB = m¯
A
B(δαAA
A
mA
). We have previously seen that ZA and ϕBm¯AB(δαAA
A
mA
) are de-
creasing in γA. In addition, the expressions in the RHS of eq.(a.30) and (a.31) are concave in
ϕBm¯
A
B(δαAA
A
mA
). Combining these pieces of information, one can verify that (εa − ε)/ε is in-
creasing in γA. Part (ii) of Proposition 5 can be easily verified by a simple inspection of equa-
tions (a.29)-(a.31). Part (iii) of the proposition follows directly from the fact that an increase in
δαi raises ZA and ϕBm¯AB(δαAA
A
mA
) (i.e., it has the opposite effect from an increase in γi). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Before we proceed with the proof of the two statements in the proposition, we describe the
function W in its most general form, and we explain how it simplifies to the expression seen
in eq.(19). Notice that the equilibrium CM consumption and work effort will differ among
buyers with different trading histories. For instance, a buyer who traded in both DM ’s carries
less money than a buyer who traded only in the home DM , so she will have to work harder
to rebalance her portfolio. What is less obvious is that the equilibrium CM consumption and
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work hours will also differ among dealers and sellers, depending on the type of buyer with
whom these agents traded earlier in the period. For instance, if γ−i is much greater than γi, then
a seller i who traded with a buyer −i will enter the CM with fewer real balances than a seller i
who traded with a local buyer, and this will negatively affect her CM consumption.
We have the follwoing possibilities. First, within country i, i ∈ {A,B}, there are two types
of buyers: Buyers B1 who traded only at the home DM , and buyers B2 who traded in both
DMs.41 Let X ij (H ij) denote the equilibrium CM consumption (work effort) for the buyer i of
type j ∈ {B1, B2}. Moreover, within each country i, there are four types of sellers: Sellers S1
who traded with buyers i of type B1, sellers S2 who traded with buyers i of type B2, sellers
S3 who traded with (foreign) buyers −i of type B2, and sellers S4 who did not trade with
anyone. Let X ij (H ij) denote the equilibrium CM consumption (work effort) for the seller i of
type j ∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4}. Finally, there are three types of dealers: Dealers Di, i ∈ {A,B} who
traded with buyers i (of type B2), and dealers DN who did not trade with anyone. Let Xj (Hj)
denote the equilibrium CM consumption (work effort) for a dealer of type j ∈ {DA,DB,DN}.
Given this discussion, the welfare function is simply the sum of net utilities over all these
types of agents weighted by their appropriate measure. We have,42
W = vαD
2
(XDA −HDA) + vαD
2
(XDB −HDB) + v(1− αD) (XDN −HDN) (a.32)
+ (1− δαA)
(
XAS1 −HAS1
)
+ δαA
(
XAS2 −HAS2
)
+ δαB
(
XAS3 −HAS3
)
+ δ(1− αB)
(
XAS4 −HAS4
)
+ (1− δαB)
(
XBS1 −HBS1
)
+ δαB
(
XBS2 −HBS2
)
+ δαA
(
XBS3 −HBS3
)
+ δ(1− αA)
(
XBS4 −HBS4
)
+ (1− δαA)
(
XAB1 −HAB1
)
+ δαA
(
XAB2 −HAB2
)
+ (1− δαB)
(
XBB1 −HBB1
)
+ δαB
(
XBB2 −HBB2
)
+ δαA
{
u(qB2A )− qB2A + u(q˜B2A )− q˜B2A
}
+ δαB
{
u(qB2B )− qB2B + u(q˜B2B )− q˜B2B
}
+ (1− δαA)
{
u(qB1A )− qB1A
}
+ (1− δαB)
{
u(qB1B )− qB1B
}
.
It is now straightforward to calculate the various equilibrium objects that appear in eq.(a.32).
For instance, only buyers, the agents who wish to acquire money, work in the CM . Hence,
H ij = 0 ∀i ∈ {A,B} and j ∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4}, and Hj = 0 ∀j ∈ {DA,DB,DN}. Dealers and
sellers will only consume in the CM , and the level of their consumption equals the amount of
real balances that they received from buyers earlier. Hence, letting CS,D denote the total net CM
41 Notice that, within country i, the B2 buyers are the C-types who also matched in the FOREX market.
42 The amount of DM good produced within a match also depends on the buyer’s type. For instance, the B1
buyer iwill typically purchase more qi in her ownDMi than the B2 type. Thus, we also differentiate qi in eq.(a.32):
qji refers to the amount of special good i produced when the buyer i is of type j, and q˜
B2
i is the amount of special
good −i produced when the buyer i is of type B2.
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utilities of (all) dealers and sellers (i.e., the first three lines in eq.(a.32)), we obtain43
CS,D = δα¯
∑
i
{Zi − 2q˜Ti }+ (1− δα¯) min{ZA, q∗}+ 2δα¯q˜TA + (1− δα¯) min{ZB, q∗}+ 2δα¯q˜TB.
Furthermore, letting CB denote the total net CM utilities of all buyer (i.e., the fourth line in
eq.(a.32)), we obtain
CB = −(1− δα¯) min{ZA, q∗} − δα¯ZA − (1− δαB) min{ZB, q∗} − δα¯ZB.
Substituting these results into eq.(a.32) and some algebra yields the expression in eq.(19).
Now consider part (i) of Proposition 6. First notice that one can re-writeW as a function of
α¯δ as follows
W(α¯δ) = 2δα¯{mi(α¯δ) +m−i(α¯δ)}+ (1− δα¯){ni(α¯δ) + n−i(α¯δ)},
mi(α¯δ) = u(q˜
T
i )− q˜Ti , ∀i,
ni(α¯δ) = u(min{Zi, q∗})−min{Zi, q∗}, ∀i,
wherem′i > 0 and n′i ≥ 0 ∀i. Then, the sign of ∂W/∂(α¯δ) depends on that of {2mi(α¯δ)−ni(α¯δ)}+
α¯δ{2m′i − n′i}. Since Zi > q˜Ti for all θ > 0, and u is concave, we have α¯δ{2m′i − n′i} > 0. In
addition, as shown in the proof of Lemma 5, the Kalai constraint with θ > 0 always guarantees
that {2mi(α¯δ)− ni(α¯δ)} > 0. Thus, ∂W/∂(α¯δ) > 0.
Consider now part (ii). If γi ≤ µ¯i, ∀i, the proof is obvious. So let γi > µ¯i, ∀i. In this case, we
can rewriteW as a function of θ in the following way:
W(θ) = 2δα¯{xi(θ) + x−i(θ)}+ (1− δα¯){yi(θ) + y−i(θ)},
xi(θ) = u(q˜
T
i )− q˜Ti , ∀i,
yi(θ) = u(Z
i)− Zi, ∀i.
Since x′i < 0 and y′i > 0, ∀i, the sign ofW ′ depends on the following condition:
y′i
|x′i|
R 2δα¯
1− δα¯ ⇐⇒W
′(θ) R 0.
Finally, the existence and uniqueness of δ˜α is easily derived, since y′i/|x′i| is strictly decreasing
in δα¯ (due to the concavity of u) while 2δα¯/(1− δα¯) is strictly increasing in δα¯. Q.E.D.
43 Here, we also use the following equilibrium conditions: vαD2 (XDi − HDi) = δαi{Zi − (qi + q˜Ti )}, qB1i =
min{Zi, q∗}, and q˜B2i = qB2i = q˜Ti .
51
